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P ayment cards and associated networks  facilitate efficient retail transactions, pro-  viding enormous benefits to both buyers 
and sellers:
•	 	Debit	cards	offer	security,	convenience,	and	a	
ready access to funds that benefits consumers 
and merchants alike.
•	 	Credit	 cards	 provide	 all	 these	 benefits	 and	
more, enabling consumers to spend money 
they don’t currently have in their bank 
accounts.
•	 	This	 in	 turn	enables	merchants	 to	 sell	 addi-
tional goods and services they wouldn’t oth-
erwise sell.
•	 	By	obviating	the	need	for	expensive	in-house	
credit operations, credit cards enable small 
merchants to participate in the modern retail 
economy.
•	 	Electronic	payments	expand	small	merchants’	
geographic reach online to a degree unthink-
able in the absence of credit and debit cards.
•	 	Growth	in	the	use	of	electronic	payments	has	
also created more general benefits to society 
and the economy by increasing efficiency and 
expanding	the	availability	of	credit.
•	 	One	 study	 of	 European	 countries	 estimates	
that a country may save 1 percent or more 
of its GDP by switching from all paper to all 
electronic payments.
These benefits are often impaired by overzeal-
ous regulation. The claim – made by Canada’s 
merchants and the NDP – that interchange fee 
regulations, interference with surcharging rules, 
and restrictions on the “honour-all-cards” rule 
are beneficial to “all stakeholders, particularly 
small and medium sized businesses, entrepre-
neurs, and consumers” is simply false. The op- 
 
 
 
posite is more nearly the case. There is little 
reason to believe that most stakeholders would 
benefit from such regulations, and every reason 
to believe that consumers would be harmed.
Instead of imposing regulations on the operators 
of payment card networks, which would under-
mine competition and harm consumers, Canada 
should seek to promote competition. The most 
effective way it can do that is to remove govern-
ment-imposed restrictions on Interac that limit 
its ability to compete freely. Perhaps of greatest 
importance is the removal of restrictions on the 
setting of interchange fees. The removal of these 
restrictions would enable Interac members to 
invest in new technologies and build out their 
networks knowing that if they offer a superior 
service, they will be able to charge more for it. 
Equally important is avoiding the imposition of 
costly new restrictions, like proposed regula-
tions prohibiting the imposition of no-surcharg-
ing or honour-all-cards rules.
Sadly, rather than recognizing that the way for-
ward for Canada is to reform its debit card sys-
tem in the competitive model of its credit cards, 
some critics want to dictate significant business 
practices and impose price controls on the credit 
card market. As we demonstrate, however, the 
proposed interventions would almost certainly 
increase costs for consumers, reduce innova-
tion, and hamper the efficiency of the Canadian 
payment system.
Competition has been a key driver of the invest-
ments that have enabled the emergence of pay-
ment card ecosystems. But competition has not 
always and everywhere been permitted to op-
erate freely. For nearly 20 years, Canada’s debit 
card system has operated as a government-reg-
ulated monopoly. By contrast, its credit card 
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system has been subject to more-or-less open 
competition.
These regulations have produced unintended 
and undesirable effects. Generally, they distort 
incentives, undermine investment in system 
expansion	 and	 the	 deployment	 of	 new	 tech-
nologies, and slow up the shift to electronic 
payments.
Notably, the Interac Consent Order (a set of re-
strictions on the operation of Interac, including 
its nonprofit status, governance structure, and 
caps on interchange fees, that were established 
following a ruling by the Competition Tribu-
nal that Interac was anti-competitive), although 
aimed solely at the “debit market,” has artifi-
cially lowered the costs of interchange fees for 
debit card transactions and thereby incentivized 
merchants to discriminate against other forms 
of payment, likely slowing the development of 
credit card and mobile payments in Canada.
This	has	had	follow-on	consequences.	For	exam-
ple, the difficulty of using debit cards for trans-
actions online and the slower adoption of credit 
cards has likely contributed to the relatively 
slow uptake of online transacting by Canadians. 
Meanwhile, the lack of Interac’s international 
interoperability	 has	 made	 it	 exceedingly	 diffi-
cult for Canadians travelling abroad to use their 
debit cards.
In the US, regulation of interchange fees for 
debit cards under the Durbin Amendment has 
resulted in harmful cost shifting. Banks have sig-
nificantly reduced the availability of free chequ-
ing accounts, with particularly deleterious effect 
on poorer consumers. In 2009, prior to Durbin, 
76 percent of banks offered free chequing; by 
the end of 2012, that had fallen to 39 percent.
Australia’s	experience	with	interchange	fee	price	
controls is similar. There is no evidence that 
Australia’s comprehensive cap on interchange 
fees – in place since 2003 – has resulted in lower 
retail prices for consumers. Australian consum-
ers on average are unambiguously paying more 
and getting less as a result of the country’s inter-
change fee price controls and payment network 
regulation.
There is no evidence that this regulation of pay-
ment cards has benefited consumers in the form 
of lower retail prices. In other words consumers 
face considerably higher banking costs, while 
paying the same for their consumer goods. Since 
the higher banking costs fall disproportionately 
on poorer consumers, interchange fee and pay-
ment network regulation have been distinctly re-
gressive. Moreover, while the enactment of such 
regulation may have proven a boon to large “big 
box”	retailers,	it	has	actually	resulted	in	a	price	
increase for many small merchants.
Worldwide, large merchants have benefited from 
payment	network	regulations	at	the	expense	of	
consumers. There is every reason to believe the 
same outcome will continue to occur in Canada 
if current efforts to regulate are enacted and un-
less	existing	regulations	are	relaxed.
Résumé	Exécutif
L es	cartes	de	paiement	et	leurs	réseaux	ren-  dent plus faciles et plus efficaces les opéra-  tions de détail, ce qui procure ainsi 
d’énormes	 avantages	 à	 la	 fois	 aux	 acheteurs	 et	
aux	vendeurs	:
•	 	Les	cartes	de	débit	offrent	la	sécurité,	la	com-
modité et une facilité d’accès à des fonds qui 
bénéficient	autant	aux	consommateurs	qu’aux	
commerçants. 
•	 	Les	cartes	de	crédit	offrent	encore	plus	d’avan-
tages,	 car	 elles	 permettent	 aux	 consomma-
teurs de dépenser de l’argent qu’ils n’ont pas 
actuellement dans leurs comptes bancaires.
•	 	En	 retour,	 ceci	permet	 aux	 commerçants	de	
vendre des biens et des services qu’ils ne 
pourraient offrir autrement.
•	 	En	 leur	 évitant	 de	 coûteuses	 opérations	 in-
ternes de crédit, les cartes de crédit permet-
tent	 aux	 petits	 commerçants	 de	 participer	
pleinement à l’économie moderne du com-
merce de détail. 
•	 	En	outre,	les	paiements	électroniques	leur	per-
mettent d’accroître leur portée géographique 
en ligne à un degré qui serait inimaginable en 
l’absence des cartes de crédit et de débit.
•	 	L’utilisation	 accrue	 des	 paiements	 élec-
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troniques a également engendré plusieurs 
avantages	généraux	pour	la	société	et	l’écon-
omie en augmentant l’efficacité du commerce 
de détail et en élargissant la disponibilité du 
crédit. 
•	 	Une	 étude	 menée	 dans	 les	 pays	 européens	
a révélé que passer des paiements en format 
papier	aux	paiements	électroniques	peut	faire	
économiser à un pays plus de 1 % de son PIB.
Ces avantages sont menacés par la réglemen-
tation. Il est donc tout simplement mensonger 
pour les commerçants canadiens et le NPD de 
déclarer que la réglementation en matière de 
commissions d’interchange, les interdictions de 
suppléments et les restrictions à l’égard du princ-
ipe qui dicte d’honorer tous les types de cartes 
sont bénéfiques pour « toutes les parties prenan-
tes, en particulier les petites et moyennes entre-
prises, les entrepreneurs et les consommateurs 
». C’est plutôt le contraire qui est vrai. Il y a peu 
de raisons de croire que la plupart des parties 
prenantes bénéficieraient de cette réglementa-
tion, et toutes les raisons de croire que les con-
sommateurs seraient lésés. 
Au lieu d’imposer une réglementation visant les 
exploitants	 de	 réseaux	 de	 cartes	 de	 paiement,	
qui	pourrait	miner	 la	concurrence	et	nuire	aux	
consommateurs, le Canada devrait chercher à 
promouvoir	la	concurrence.	Le	moyen	le	plus	ef-
ficace de le faire, c’est en annulant l’ordonnance 
de consentement, ou au moins certaines de ses 
dispositions clés pour assurer qu’Interac ne soit 
plus restreint par les règles limitant sa capacité 
à développer et à soutenir la concurrence. Il est 
encore plus important de supprimer les restric-
tions à l’établissement des commissions d’inter-
change.	 La	 suppression	de	 ces	 restrictions	 per-
mettrait	 aux	membres	 d’Interac	 d’investir	 dans	
de nouvelles technologies et de construire leurs 
réseaux	tout	en	sachant	que	s’ils	offrent	un	ser-
vice de qualité supérieure, ils seront en mesure 
d’établir leur facturation en conséquence. Il est 
tout aussi important d’éviter l’imposition de 
nouvelles	restrictions	coûteuses,	telles	que	celles	
qui seront prévues dans la réglementation inter-
disant d’imposer l’absence de suppléments ou 
des règles relatives à l’obligation d’honorer tous 
les types de cartes.
Malheureusement, certains critiques veulent im-
poser des pratiques commerciales et des con-
trôles	de	prix	sur	le	marché	des	cartes	de	crédit	
au lieu de reconnaître qu’une réforme du sys-
tème des cartes de débit au sein du modèle con-
currentiel des cartes de crédit est la voie à suivre 
pour le Canada. Comme nous le démontrons, 
toutefois, les interventions proposées auraient 
presque certainement pour effet d’accroître les 
coûts	 imposés	 aux	 consommateurs,	 de	 réduire	
l’innovation et d’entraver l’efficacité du système 
de paiement canadien.
La	concurrence	a	joué	un	rôle	clé	pour	amener	
les investissements ayant conduit à l’émergence 
des écosystèmes des cartes de paiement. Mais la 
concurrence n’a pas toujours été encouragée et 
n’a pas toujours fonctionné librement en tout 
lieu. Depuis près de 20 ans, le Canada est doté 
d’un système de paiement par carte de débit qui 
fonctionne comme un monopole réglementé 
par le gouvernement. Par contre, son système de 
paiement par carte de crédit s’est un peu ouvert 
à la concurrence. 
Ces réglementations ont produit des effets im-
prévisibles et indésirables. Généralement, elles 
entravent le bon fonctionnement des mesures 
incitatives, sapent l’investissement qui vise le 
développement du système et le déploiement 
de nouvelles technologies, en plus de ralentir la 
transition	aux	paiements	électroniques.	
Notamment, l’ordonnance par consentement 
du réseau Interac, bien que visant uniquement 
le « marché du débit », a artificiellement abaissé 
les	 coûts	 de	 commissions	 d’interchange	 des	
transactions par carte de débit et ainsi incité 
les commerçants à décourager d’autres formes 
de paiement, ce qui a probablement ralenti le 
développement des cartes de crédit et des paie-
ments par téléphone mobile au Canada. 
Cela	 a	 eu	 des	 conséquences.	 Par	 exemple,	 la	
difficulté d’utiliser la carte de débit pour effec-
tuer des transactions en ligne et l’adoption plus 
lente des cartes de crédit a vraisemblablement 
contribué à l’adoption relativement faible des 
transactions en ligne effectuées par les Cana-
diens. Entre-temps, le manque d’interopérabil-
ité de l’Interac à l’échelle internationale a rendu 
extrêmement	 difficile	 pour	 les	 Canadiens	 qui	
voyagent à l’étranger l’utilisation de leurs cartes 
de débit.
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Aux	 États-Unis,	 la	 réglementation	 des	 commis-
sions d’interchange par cartes de débit en vertu 
du « Durbin Amendment » a été nuisible en ter-
mes	 des	 coûts.	 Les	 banques	 ont	 considérable-
ment réduit leurs services de comptes-chèques 
gratuits, ce qui a eu des effets particulièrement 
néfastes sur les consommateurs à plus faible rev-
enu. En 2009, avant le « Durbin Amendment », 
76 % des banques offraient des comptes-chèques 
gratuits; à la fin de 2012, cette proportion avait 
chuté à 39 %. 
L’expérience	de	l’Australie	relativement	au	con-
trôle	des	prix	sur	les	commissions	d’interchange	
est similaire. Rien ne confirme que la limite sur 
les commissions d’interchange mise en place par 
l’Australie depuis 2003 a entraîné une diminution 
des	prix	de	détail	pour	les	consommateurs.	Sans	
contredit, les consommateurs australiens paient 
davantage en moyenne et obtiennent moins de 
résultats à la suite de la mise en vigueur du con-
trôle	des	prix	sur	les	commissions	d’interchange	
et	de	la	réglementation	touchant	les	réseaux	de	
paiement. 
Rien ne permet de conclure que cette réglemen-
tation des cartes de paiement a entraîné une 
baisse	des	prix	de	détail	qui	a	bénéficié	aux	con-
sommateurs. En d’autres termes, les consom-
mateurs doivent débourser considérablement 
plus pour acquitter leurs frais bancaires, tout en 
payant	 le	même	 prix	 pour	 leurs	 biens	 de	 con-
sommation. Puisque les frais bancaires touchent 
de façon disproportionnée les consommateurs à 
plus faible revenu, la réglementation sur les com-
missions	 d’interchange	 et	 les	 réseaux	 de	 paie-
ment a été nettement régressive. En outre, alors 
que l’adoption d’une telle réglementation peut 
avoir constitué une aubaine pour les grandes sur-
faces, elle a effectivement entraîné une augmen-
tation	des	prix	pour	un	grand	nombre	de	petits	
commerçants.
À l’échelle mondiale, les grands commerçants 
ont	bénéficié	de	 la	 réglementation	des	 réseaux	
de paiement au détriment des consommateurs. Il 
y	a	toutes	les	raisons	de	croire	que	les	mêmes	ré-
sultats continueront de se produire au Canada si 
les efforts actuels se soldent par la mise en place 
d’une nouvelle réglementation et que celle qui 
est déjà en place n’est pas assouplie.
Introduction
C anada – and Canadians – have bene-  fited from being relatively early adopters  of electronic payments, in the form of 
payment cards. This was stimulated in part by 
a consortium of banks and credit unions devel-
oping an interoperable payment network in the 
1980s, Interac, which enabled widespread use of 
debit cards. But in recent years, Canada seems 
to have fallen behind other countries: in a 2010 
survey by Nielson, 28 percent of Canadians had 
never made an online purchase, whereas only 15 
percent of Americans said the same. Meanwhile, 
a Boston Consulting Group study found that in 
2010 Canadians made only 3.4 percent of their 
retail purchases online, compared with 5 per-
cent in the US and 13.5 percent in the UK (Dean 
et al. 2012).
A recent study for Canada Post looked at online 
shoppers’ decisions and found that of the fac-
tors assessed, “ease of checkout” was the second 
most important in determining whether a pur-
chase was made (2013). Given the importance 
of payment systems to the checkout process, it 
is reasonable to conclude that the relatively slow 
adoption of online shopping is at least in part 
due to the difficulty of making such transactions 
using debit cards, which are used for more than 
half of all consumer electronic payments in the 
country (Task Force for the Payment System Re-
view 2010).
Paradoxically,	 the	dominance	 (at	 least	until	 re-
cently) of debit in Canada may in part be due 
to a legal challenge brought against Interac by 
the Director of Investigation and Research at the 
behest of merchants in 1995, alleging that the 
payment network had abused its dominant po-
Canadians benefited from 
being early adopters of 
electronic payments.
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sition. Among other things, the resultant Con-
sent Order imposed by the Competition Tribu-
nal in 1996 capped interchange fees and lifted 
restrictions on the application of surcharges by 
merchants. These changes to the contractually 
agreed terms of Interac transactions reduced 
the marginal cost to merchants of accepting In-
terac-based debit cards. As a result, some mer-
chants initially chose to accept only debit cards, 
which in turn incentivized some consumers to 
hold debit cards but not credit cards.
But the restrictive nature of Interac’s governance 
framework and fees meant that it was not able to 
keep up with consumer trends. In particular, it 
did not quickly adapt to the emergence of online 
transactions, it was slow to introduce secure on-
line payment methods, and to this day it is nearly 
impossible to use outside Canada. By contrast, 
companies in the still competitive credit card 
market have been quick to innovate, enabling 
consumers to make transactions online securely, 
both at domestic and foreign websites. As a re-
sult, in the past decade, consumers have shifted 
towards using credit cards – and the total value 
of	credit	card	transactions	now	exceeds	that	of	
debit, though the number of debit transactions 
still	exceeds	credit.
Perhaps responding to this recent resurgence 
in use of credit cards, merchants convinced the 
Competition Bureau to bring a case against the 
operators of two payment networks, Visa and 
MasterCard, claiming that they have also abused 
their dominant position. The Commissioner of 
Competition had sought an order limiting sur-
charges on the use of premium cards, relying on 
language in section 76 of the Competition Act. 
The Competition Tribunal found that neither 
the legislative history nor other Tribunal deci-
sions could support an order, but suggested that 
a	legislative	fix	is	in	order.	
The Tribunal case was followed by a call by the 
New Democratic Party (NDP) for radical politi-
cal intervention into the payment card network. 
According to the NDP Orange Paper, “[t]he cost 
associated with processing electronic payments 
continues to hamper the competitiveness of 
Canadian business,” and “high” credit card pro-
cessing fees result in “reduced profit margins 
for merchants [especially small businesses] and 
higher retail costs for consumers” (Thibeault 
2013). Moreover, although the NDP admits that 
higher costs to consumers are offset by the use 
of rewards cards (which essentially amount to a 
rebate or price reduction on purchased goods or 
services), this benefit to consumers comes at the 
expense	of	small	businesses	and	“cash-	and	deb-
it-using consumers (indirectly through higher 
prices).” The NDP touts the Interac network as 
a more-effective alternative to the market-based 
process by which credit card processing fees are 
set.1
Based on these assertions, the NDP urges a new 
regulatory regime for the Canadian credit card 
market. Although many of the party’s proposals 
are vague, the NDP supports three specific inter-
ventions (Thibeault 2013, 4):
•	 	First,	the	party	urges	the	imposition	of	a	“hard	
[price] cap” on interchange fees modeled af-
ter the one imposed in Australia several years 
ago. 
•	 	Second,	the	party	urges	mandating	that	mer-
chants be permitted to impose surcharges on 
credit card transactions. 
•	 	Finally,	the	NDP	supports	a	ban	on	the	“hon-
our-all-cards” rule negotiated as part of the 
contracts between payment card networks 
and merchants that choose to accept the net-
work’s cards.
The NDP Orange Paper urges the adoption of a 
“hard cap” on payment card interchange fees, 
claiming that consumers will benefit because 
savings to merchants of reduced costs for pay-
ment cards will be passed on to consumers 
in the form of lower prices (2). In addition, it 
claims that small businesses will benefit through 
lower costs for accepting payment cards.
An alternative argument made by proponents of 
A restrictive framework 
prevents Interac from  
adapting to consumer  
trends.
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price controls on interchange fees and prohibi-
tions on surcharge restrictions is the claim that 
use of rewards cards, which are owned predom-
inantly by higher-income consumers, results in 
unfair wealth redistribution from low-income 
consumers to high-income consumers.
But does the evidence support these conten-
tions? We thoroughly investigated all the avail-
able evidence, from Canada and around the 
world, in order to assess the merits and likely 
impacts of such interventions. The paper pro-
ceeds as follows:
•	 	We	 begin	 with	 a	 brief	 history	 and	 explana-
tion of payment card systems, followed by an 
explanation	of	 the	role	of	payment	network	
providers in building out and maintaining 
balance in payment systems. We show that a 
payment	network	is	a	classic	example	of	what	
economists call a “two sided market.”
•	 	We	 next	 discuss	 the	 dynamic	 nature	 of	 this	
market and the implications for attempts at 
regulatory	 intervention.	We	show,	for	exam-
ple, that the scope of a market may be diffi-
cult to define ex ante. As a result, interven-
tions in one “market” (such as the Interac 
consent order, which is aimed solely at the 
“debit market”) have repercussions in other 
“markets” (such as the market for credit cards 
and mobile payments). 
•	 	We	next	turn	to	a	discussion	of	the	evidence	
of	the	economic	effects	of	various	examples	of	
payment system regulation, especially inter-
change fee regulation and interventions that 
prohibit certain common practices, such as 
restrictions on fee surcharging. We stress the 
importance – for the purposes of regulating 
payment networks – of understanding how 
costs and benefits are distributed throughout 
the system, including how and whether mer-
chants’ costs are passed on to consumers.
•	 	Finally,	 we	 evaluate	 some	 recent	 proposals	
for payment network regulation, including 
the Tribunal decision and the NDP Orange 
Paper.	For	context	and	contrast,	we	describe	
other regulatory changes that might facilitate 
more	 dynamic	 competition	 and	 expand	 the	
benefits and range of payment options for Ca-
nadian consumers.
The Role, 
Function, and 
Benefits of 
Payment Cards
A lthough often taken for granted, the  modern electronic payment card sys-  tem is a true marvel: an instantaneous, 
secure, globally connected system available 
24 hours a day, in person, online, or over the 
phone. Consumers can travel the globe (and 
businesses can conduct commerce around the 
globe) without a penny in their pockets. Elec-
tronic payments are the cornerstone of the evolv-
ing e-commerce economy and mobile banking 
platforms, which have brought the convenience 
and efficiency of modern payments systems to 
billions of people around the globe. 
To understand how the modern electronic pay-
ment card system works today, it helps to go 
back to the beginning. In 1914, Western Union 
began offering charge cards to some customers. 
In the 1920s, many larger US stores followed suit 
– several using a system called “Charge Plate.” 
These simple, “two-party” charge cards were a 
formal way for merchants to offer short-term 
credit to regular customers, which would typi-
cally be paid off in full at a specified date. 
While some merchants no doubt accepted cards 
from other stores early on, Diners’ Club estab-
lished the first full-fledged payment network in 
1951.	American	Express	followed	in	1958.	These	
“three-party” cards enabled (and still enable) 
consumers to acquire goods in multiple stores, 
with payment being made by the card issuer, to 
Electronic payments are the 
cornerstone of e-commerce  
and mobile banking.
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be repaid by the card owner at a later date. 
In the 1960s, two groups of banks established 
their own payment networks, which eventually 
became MasterCard and Visa. These “four-party” 
systems (and other similar networks) work as fol-
lows: (1) the consumer obtains goods or services 
from (2) the merchant, and (3) the merchant’s 
“acquirer” then acquires funds from (4) the card 
issuer (the company who issued the card to the 
consumer and to whom the consumer will owe 
payment). Meanwhile, the entire process occurs 
over a platform operated by one of the payment 
networks.
As the history of payment cards attests, these 
payment systems were developed for the mutual 
benefit of the various parties – not only consum-
ers, but merchants, as well. 
The Benefits of Payment Cards 
for Merchants and Consumers
As a payment device, debit cards offer merchants 
two important benefits over cash for many trans-
actions: ticket lift and faster throughput of cus-
tomers	(Layne-Farrar	2011,	14).	Merchants	that	
accept debit cards reduce consumers’ liquidity 
constraints, enabling them to spend more than 
they have in their pockets at the time of sale. 
This	 could,	 for	 example,	 allow	 a	 consumer	 to	
take advantage of a temporary sale or make an 
impulse buy, both of which benefit merchants. 
As a result, by making payments more efficient 
(in	 this	 case	 by	 relaxing	 liquidity	 constraints),	
payment cards provide a benefit to merchants in 
excess	of	their	cost.	
In addition, merchants have benefited from 
the processing and payment speed of payment 
cards, which have increased dramatically over 
time.	For	example,	 less	 than	a	decade	ago,	 the	
approximate	 time	 for	 checkout	 for	 cash	 and	
electronic payments at fast food restaurants was 
essentially the same. Since that time, however, 
the payment speed of cash has remained largely 
the same while the payment speed of payment 
cards has fallen by half. This increase in payment 
speed enables merchants to serve more custom-
ers at lower labour cost, and to serve customers 
faster, thus benefiting other customers, as well, 
who	do	not	have	to	wait	as	long	in	line	(Layne-
Farrar 2011, 17–8). This advantage is especially 
valuable for high-volume merchants, such as fast 
food restaurants, for which rapid customer ser-
vice is an essential part of their business model. 
The relative advantage of electronic payments 
thus also increases as the wages of retail em-
ployees	 increase.	 Consider,	 for	 example,	 the	
dramatic increase in checkout speed, reduction 
in labour costs, and increased throughput of gas 
stations adopting “pay at the pump” technology, 
and the similar benefits from self-check check-
out lines at grocery stores. 
According to one economist, once the benefits 
of accepting payment cards are considered (no-
tably ticket lift and faster throughput), for a wide 
range of transactions payment cards turn out to 
be less costly for merchants to accept than cash, 
even	including	fees	(Layne-Farrar	2011,	57).	That	
the value of McDonald’s stock rose 2.7 percent 
on the news that it would start accepting payment 
cards is additional evidence that the benefits to 
merchants	of	card	acceptance	exceed	the	costs.2
Perhaps most significantly, global electronic pay-
ment card systems offer valuable computational 
and logistical services to supplement their basic 
payment functionality that other payment sys-
tems (such as cash and cheques) can’t replicate. 
These product attributes enable almost friction-
less transactions, reduce fraud risk, enhance fi-
nancial	 services	 competition	 by	 extending	 the	
geographic reach of financial institutions, and 
enable the customization of payment instru-
ments through rewards and branding.
The enormous growth in use of debit and credit 
cards is testament to the scale of those mutual 
benefits. Between 2006 and 2010 alone, the vol-
ume of transactions made using the three larg-
est payment networks (Visa, MasterCard, and 
The payment speed of  
payment cards has fallen by 
half in less than 10 years.
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American	Express)	rose	from	around	$4	trillion	
to	over	$6	 trillion	 (Chen	2012).	Moreover,	 the	
growth of credit card usage by consumers and 
the commensurate growth of the payment card 
industry have enabled more merchants to out-
source their credit operations to banks – special-
ized and far more efficient providers. This has 
relieved merchants and consumers of the costs 
from	 risk,	 fraud,	 expense,	 delay,	 and	potential	
customer ill will associated with operating in
-house credit operations (Zywicki 2000; Rochet 
and Wright 2010).
The Benefits of Payment Cards 
for Society
Beyond the benefits to both consumers and busi-
nesses, the growth in the use of electronic pay-
ments has benefited society and the economy 
generally through more efficient payments and 
credit systems. One study of European countries 
estimates that a country may save 1 percent or 
more of its GDP by switching from all paper to 
all electronic payments (Humphrey 2003).
Electronic	 payments	 can	 also	 reduce	 tax	 eva-
sion. Cash can be used without leaving a paper 
trail,	making	tax	evasion	and	other	illegal	activ-
ities, such as the handling of stolen goods, far 
easier than with electronic payments (Clotfelter 
1983).3	It	is	estimated,	for	example,	that	70	to	80	
percent of OECD currency stock is either held 
in the domestic underground economy or in 
developing countries (Rogoff 1998). A study of 
the effect of the growth of debit card usage from 
1988 to 2003 found substantial substitution of 
debit cards for small denomination currency but 
almost no impact on larger denomination cur-
rency, which the study attributes to the contin-
ued	usage	of	large	bills	for	tax	evasion	and	crimi-
nal activity (Amromin and Chakravorti 2007).
Credit and debit cards can also reduce crime. 
Consumers tend to use credit cards more fre-
quently in high-crime geographic areas, as they 
are less vulnerable to theft than cash (Hum-
phrey, Pulley, and Vesala 1996). Moreover, ac-
cess to globalized payment networks also facili-
tates international travel and payments – as any 
Canadian carrying an Interac-only branded debit 
card abroad can attest.
The Additional Benefits of 
Credit Cards, Particularly for 
Smaller Merchants
Credit cards offer additional benefits to mer-
chants because they enable consumers to make 
purchases even when they do not have sufficient 
cash in their bank accounts. Prior to the nearly 
ubiquitous acceptance and use of bank-type 
credit cards, many merchants, both large and 
small, offered credit to their customers (Zywicki 
2000,	 92–93).	 It	 was	 very	 expensive	 and	 risky	
for merchants to manage credit operations. Un-
like today’s large, sophisticated, and specialized 
credit card issuers and processing networks, 
retailers	 lacked	 the	 comparative	 expertise	 and	
economies of scale to operate credit operations 
efficiently and to minimize losses. This was espe-
cially so for smaller merchants that simply could 
not afford to operate credit operations or bear 
the risk of uncollectible debts. Moreover, many 
retailers were reluctant to collect from delin-
quent borrowers for fear of alienating customers 
and developing a negative reputation. 
As a result, the fees charged by credit card issuers 
to any merchant must be judged against the to-
tal cost incurred by that merchant to operate its 
own credit operation (Rochet and Wright 2010, 
1790). There is no strong empirical evidence of 
how costly proprietary credit operations were 
for those who ran them. Nevertheless, consid-
ering that most retailers have chosen largely to 
outsource their credit operations to bank card 
issuers,	it	seems	likely	that	those	costs	exceeded	
the costs of credit card operations, especially 
once the indirect costs (such as lost goodwill 
from aggressive collection on delinquent ac-
counts) are considered.
These effects are most significant for small mer-
chants. For these retailers, the cost of operating 
an in-house credit system would be prohibitive. 
The availability of widespread, instantly available 
credit offered by banks permits small merchants 
to compete in the modern world. Indeed, while 
it was economically feasible – if often inefficient 
– for large retailers to operate in-house credit 
card programs, these programs were simply not 
practical for the millions of smaller merchants 
that lacked the resources and sophistication 
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needed to implement a card program. 
Likewise,	in	the	absence	of	the	widespread	use	
of online commerce facilitated by electronic pay-
ment systems, smaller retailers were limited in 
their ability to access geographically-dispersed 
consumers. As a result, larger retailers were able 
to use their card programs to make significant 
sales gains over their smaller competitors. Thus 
modern-day payment card systems now also 
provide small businesses with access to the pur-
chasing power of literally millions of cardhold-
ers around the world. These important effects 
enable small businesses to compete with larger 
merchants for many of the same transactions on 
a scale that would not be possible in absence of 
these electronic systems.
In short, credit card systems have created more 
product market competition and opened up en-
tire new lines of business to entrepreneurs that 
would otherwise be foreclosed to them.
Summing Up the Benefits
The ubiquitous acceptance and use of payment 
cards in the modern economy is evidence of the 
economic truism that the benefits of successful 
goods	and	services	must	exceed	their	costs.	Nev-
ertheless, merchants often object that they have 
“no choice” but to accept payment cards, even 
if they do not want to. But this objection misses 
the mark. If it is true – and there is no reason 
to believe that it is – then why is it so? It is not, 
as merchants imply, because card networks re-
quire them to accept their cards, but rather be-
cause their customers request this amenity. As 
a result, merchants must respond to customer 
demand, even if it results in higher costs. But 
in that case the cost to merchants of accepting 
cards in a competitive market is no different than 
the cost of providing accessible stores, parking, 
or	 free	 samples	 (for	example)	–	 also	amenities	
demanded by consumers. Hiring polite, well-
groomed, and helpful sales employees may 
be more costly to a business than hiring surly, 
unclean, and rude ones; clean, well-lit stores 
are more costly to operate than unclean, dark 
stores. Yet merchants are “forced” to provide po-
lite employees and clean stores in response to 
customer demand because the benefits that they 
receive	from	hiring	polite	employees	exceed	the	
higher wages that they must pay in order to re-
tain them. The same is true for payment cards.
When evaluating (and regulating) particular as-
pects of payment systems, it is important to keep 
these benefits in mind. Unfortunately, many 
analyses of payment systems forget that readily 
perceived costs are accompanied by less-obvi-
ous (but no less significant) benefits, and that 
the benefits are mutual. When legal or political 
intervention is based on such a one-sided analy-
sis, there is a danger that intervention will cause 
more harm than good.
Understanding 
the Mechanics 
of Payments 
Systems: A System 
in Balance
I n some respects, payment systems resemble 	 ecosystems;	 they	 are	 highly	 complex	 webs	  that have evolved over time in response to 
propagation and selection pressures. The cur-
rent structure of any payment system represents 
a fine balance between the felt needs of millions 
of businesses and consumers. Just as care and 
caution must be taken when attempting to “im-
prove” an ecosystem, so must care and caution 
be taken when considering intervention in a suc-
cessful	and	complex	payment	system.	Failure	to	
do so may well upset this fine balance.
Credit card systems created 
more product market 
competition and opened 
up new lines of business to 
entrepreneurs.
Ian Lee, Geoffrey A. Manne, Julian Morris, and Todd J. Zywicki  |  October 2013 11
In a standard two-party payment card system 
(such as a department store credit system), the 
merchant is also the card issuer and acquirer. As 
a result, balance is easily achieved: The merchant 
offers regular customers terms that balance the 
benefits of increased sales against the risk of de-
fault and the costs of operating the system. But 
relatively inefficient two-party systems inherently 
leave many potential transactions on the table 
by limiting the pool of participants. Three-and 
four-party payment card systems overcome that 
defect by enabling the same card to be used in 
multiple stores, economizing on operating costs 
by concentrating them in banks and payment 
processors which can bear them more efficiently. 
But balance in a three- or four-party system is far 
more	complex	than	in	a	two-party	system.	
Balancing “Two-Sided 
Markets”
Two-party	systems	are	an	example	of	what	econ-
omists call “one-sided markets”: there is just one 
seller and one clearly defined group of buyers. 
These are the kinds of markets that students typ-
ically learn about in Economics 101. Sellers seek 
to meet the needs of buyers in the most effective 
and profitable way. Changes to their products 
(in this case, primarily the terms and conditions 
of their cards) provide them with feedback re-
garding how best to balance the system.
Three-and four-party systems, by contrast, are 
examples	of	“two-sided	markets”:	there	are	many	
sellers and many different kinds of buyers, trans-
acting across a platform that belongs to neither. 
Balance in such systems emerges over time, as 
the acquirers, issuers, and payment system oper-
ators adjust to the needs of sellers (merchants) 
and buyers (consumers), determining the terms 
of	exchange	that	will	 facilitate	 transactions	and	
maximize	value	for	both	groups.
Two-sided markets are ubiquitous in the econ-
omy.4	The	quintessential	example	is	the	newspa-
per, which brings together advertisers and con-
sumers, with news coverage (and other content) 
serving as the bridge to connect the two sides of 
the	market.	More	modern	examples	include	Ap-
ple’s iTunes App Store, Internet search engines 
like Google, and Adobe’s portable document 
format (pdf) software. 
Pricing in a two-sided market is complicated and 
it is common for one side effectively to subsidize 
the other. Newspapers charge advertisers – and 
thus subsidize readers – an amount sufficient 
to attract the optimal number of readers and fi-
nance the optimal scope of distribution of the 
newspaper. Readers pay either a newsstand fee 
or a subscription fee, which is often much less 
than the marginal cost of producing and distrib-
uting the newspaper; sometimes the fee is zero.
Likewise,	 advertisers	 pay	 app	 developers,	 en-
abling consumers to download apps for free, 
which in turn incentivizes consumers to buy Ap-
ple’s products. Meanwhile, Apple profits from 
ad revenue (it takes 30 percent of gross reve-
nue) and from the sale of products that run the 
apps (2013). And advertisers pay to promote 
their wares on Google, enabling users to run the 
browser and search for items for free.
Adobe’s business model is based on producers 
of pdf documents paying to purchase the pdf 
writer software, which permits them to create 
documents. Those who simply wish to read pdf 
documents can download the pdf reader soft-
ware for free, ensuring that creators have an au-
dience for their output. Thus, those who pay to 
produce pdf documents effectively pay for both 
the pdf writer and pdf reader software.
These	examples	illustrate	a	key	principle	of	two-
sided markets: “Subsidies” often run from the 
party on one side of the market to users on the 
other side through what would otherwise seem 
to be below-cost or even zero-cost pricing. More 
generally, in such markets it is typical for the 
more “inelastic” (less price-sensitive) users of the 
platform to subsidize those who are more “elas-
tic” (whose consumption decisions are more 
sensitive	to	price).	Thus,	it	is	to	be	expected	that	
those who advertise on Google or in a newspa-
per would bear a disproportionate share of the 
cost of producing the platform relative to the 
share borne by consumers directly (Evans 2008).
To reiterate, the key point to recognize about 
two-sided markets is that both parties benefit 
from the creation, operation, and continued de-
velopment of the platform that brings the two 
sides of the market together. In most cases, the 
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greater the size and efficiency of the network, 
the more valuable it is to each party. As a matter 
of basic economics, parties will participate in the 
network	only	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 value	 the	
benefits that they receive from it more than the 
costs that it imposes on them. 
Competition and Innovation 
in a Balanced System
Two-sided markets are often highly dynamic and 
subject to change wrought by disruptive tech-
nologies. But such innovations nearly always 
benefit both sides of the market, thereby main-
taining the balance – or at least achieving a new 
balance. Consider the impact of ubiquitous ac-
cess to the Internet on newspapers. Consumers 
increasingly choose to read their news online or 
on e-readers, so demand for printed newspapers 
has fallen, and advertisers have switched to on-
line media, which enable them to reach their tar-
get audience more effectively and at lower cost. 
Again, both consumers and advertisers have ben-
efited from this switch – it is only the newspa-
pers stuck in the old print-based business model 
that have suffered.
Likewise,	 cheques	 have	 traditionally	 been	 rela-
tively	 expensive	 and	 no-frills	 payment	 devices	
providing a range of benefits to both consum-
ers and merchants.5 Debit cards provide many 
of the traditional benefits of cheques but also 
have other attributes, including significantly 
lower cost to consumers and reduced risk to 
merchants of nonpayment. This mutual benefit 
to	consumers	and	merchants	explains	the	rapid	
rise of debit cards in the economy and the reduc-
tion in cheque use.
These	examples	demonstrate	the	benefits	of	in-
novation – and also of competition. Specifically, 
they demonstrate what is sometimes called “plat-
form competition” or “competition for the mar-
ket.” In each case, one type of market or plat-
form (newspapers, cheque-based transactions) 
is subject to competition from another type of 
market or platform (Internet-based news, debit 
cards). When Diners Club was first introduced, 
it had an effective monopoly in the charge card 
market and charged merchants a discount rate of 
7	percent.	When	American	Express	entered	the	
market, the competition drove innovation and 
led to reduced merchant fees. When the banks 
created their networks, competition for the mar-
ket became more intense yet, resulting in inno-
vative products and still lower fees.
In Canada, banks first began to issue debit 
cards in the 1970s. These early cards could be 
used only at automated bank machines (ABMs) 
owned by the issuing bank or trust company. In 
the early 1980s, Royal Bank of Canada and the 
Bank of Montreal each made separate arrange-
ments with different international payment net-
works so that their customers could use wider 
networks of ABMs. They subsequently each then 
offered other Canadian banks and trust compa-
nies the opportunity to join their proprietary 
networks, providing interoperability and access 
to international networks. 
In late 1984, Royal Bank of Canada and four 
other large Canadian banks using the Visa pay-
ment network agreed to join their proprietary 
networks together to form Interac, a fully inter-
operable network with access to other interna-
tional systems. A year later, the Bank of Montreal 
and three of Canada’s largest MasterCard-issuing 
banks and trust companies also joined Interac. 
These nine banks and trust companies were 
known as the Charter Members of Interac.
Initially,	 Interac	 existed	 primarily	 as	 a	 “shared	
cash dispensing” (SCD) service – enabling indi-
viduals with a debit card issued by one Interac 
member to obtain cash from an ABM of any 
other member. In 1990, Interac began to offer 
“Interac direct payment” (IDP), a service that 
enabled debit cardholders to use their cards at 
merchants’ point of sale (POS) terminals. Both 
of these services offered clear benefits both to 
consumers and merchants. 
Innovation nearly  
always benefits both sides of  
the market.
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The ability to withdraw money at any time of 
day from any ABM meant that consumers could 
carry smaller amounts of cash with them, reduc-
ing the risk of theft, and enabling them to make 
unplanned purchases more easily. Merchants 
benefited from consumers who were able to 
withdraw money more easily and conveniently. 
These advantages were magnified with the in-
troduction of IDP, which meant that consumers 
didn’t have to search for an ABM before making 
a purchase. 
These benefits to consumers and merchants of 
banking with a member of Interac rapidly be-
came apparent, and between 1984 and 1995 a 
further 18 banks and trust companies joined 
as “sponsor” members, with access to Interac 
through the switch of a Charter Member. 
Disturbing the Balance: 
Interac
In 1995, the Director of Investigation and Re-
search brought a case against Interac, alleging 
that the respondents jointly through In-
terac have substantial or complete control 
of a class or species of business in Can-
ada; that is, they have joint market power 
in a relevant market. The relevant market 
identified by the Director was the sup-
ply of shared electronic network services 
(“SENS”), also referred to as the “interme-
diate” market. The respondents were al-
leged to have engaged in anticompetitive 
acts which has had, is having, and, unless 
restrained, is likely to continue to have the 
effect of preventing or substantially less-
ening competition in Canada in two mar-
kets. The first market is the intermediate 
market for the supply of SENS. The second 
market is the “retail” market for the sup-
ply of shared electronic financial services 
(“SEFS”) to consumers. (Canada (Director 
of Investigation and Research) v. Bank of 
Montreal et al.)
But whether or not the acts undertaken by mem-
bers of Interac were anti-competitive depends 
on one’s definition of the “market.” The two 
markets described by the Director of Investiga-
tion and Research were, at the time of the case, 
still evolving. It is difficult to know precisely 
how they would have evolved. What would have 
happened to the other 128 deposit-taking mem-
bers of the Canadian Payments Association that 
existed	 in	1995,	 for	example?	Would	they	have	
joined Interac? Merged? Gone bust? Or would 
some or all of them have developed a parallel 
network – or joined another one, such as PayPal?
In any case, the Director’s definition of the rele-
vant markets seems at odds with the actual mar-
kets	 that	existed	at	 the	 time.	 In	particular,	 IDP	
was in direct competition with the various com-
peting credit card networks (notwithstanding 
the fact that the IDP ran – and runs – over the 
same payment networks).6 But by defining the 
market very narrowly, the Director effectively 
defined away this competition. And this narrow 
definition has had wide-ranging impacts, includ-
ing	–	paradoxically	–	reducing	competition.
The Consent Order turned Interac into a non-
profit with a new governance structure deter-
mined by the Tribunal, opened membership up 
far more widely, changed the terms on which a 
member could be a “direct connector” (DC), and 
revoked Interac’s previous service access fee ar-
rangement, replacing it with a narrowly circum-
scribed “switch fee” (Canada (Director of Investi-
gation and Research) v. Bank of Montreal et al.).
The upshot of all this was that membership of 
Interac	expanded	and	the	number	of	merchants	
offering POS transactions through IDP increased. 
At the same time, the lower costs of IDP transac-
tions encouraged merchants to give preferential 
treatment to debit over credit. As a result, by 
2003 Canadians had become the highest per ca-
pita users of debit cards in the world (Task Force 
for the Payment System Review 2010).
Despite initially boosting  
debit use, Interac’s share of  
electronic transactions  
is falling.
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However, Interac’s share of the total volume of 
electronic transactions has been falling – though 
it still accounted for 55 percent of all transac-
tions in 2012 (The Nilson Report 2013). More-
over, today credit cards are accepted by a larger 
number	of	Canadian	merchants	(approximately	
770,000 accept either Visa or MasterCard or 
both) (Canadian Bankers Association 2013) than 
debit	 cards	 (approximately	 470,000)	 (Interac).	
Meanwhile,	 there	are	approximately	29	million	
active Visa and MasterCard accounts (Canadian 
Bankers Association 2013) and only 23 million 
active debit card accounts (Interac).
The recent resurgence in use of credit cards in 
Canada reflects the fact that Canada’s credit card 
system is state-of-the-art and fully integrated 
with the modern globalized payment system. 
By contrast, the heavily regulated Interac debit 
card system has not adapted well to the chang-
ing technological environment – and was heavily 
criticized on this basis by the Task Force for the 
Payments System Review in its recent report, The 
Way We Pay (2011).7	For	example,	whereas	Ca-
nadians can use credit cards seamlessly to make 
payments online or throughout the world, their 
debit cards lack easy e-commerce functionality 
and only have limited acceptance in the US – and 
none whatsoever outside the US (Bergevin and 
Zywicki 2012).
Moreover, consistent with the economic theory 
of two-sided markets, whereas merchants gain 
huge benefits from consumer use of payment 
cards, these benefits are subsidized by con-
sumers who pay high banking fees to use debit 
cards, both directly and indirectly through pay-
ing higher fees for bank accounts, while receiv-
ing lower quality than in other countries. As one 
set of economists observes comparing payment 
card systems in Canada and the US, “Canadian 
consumers pay more and get less … than Amer-
ican consumers” (Evans, Chang, and Weichert 
2011, 5).
In the US, in 2009 (prior to the enactment of 
the Durbin Amendment), 76 percent of US 
chequing accounts had no monthly service fees 
and most related products, such as debit cards, 
online banking, and electronic bill-pay services 
were free, as well (25). Consumers had unlim-
ited free debit card transactions. Moreover, the 
average minimum balance needed to qualify for 
free	chequing	was	only	about	US$185.
In Canada, by contrast, average annual fees 
on chequing accounts in 2011 were between 
C$131-$167	for	premium	accounts	with	unlim-
ited	debit	card	transactions	and	between	C$84-
$125	for	basic	accounts	with	20	free	debit	card	
transactions per month and additional fees for 
debit card transactions above 20 per month (26). 
According to one estimate, about 30 percent of 
Canadian bank accounts pay no service fees, but 
the average minimum balance for a “free” ac-
count	was	approximately	C$1000.	Thus,	in	con-
trast to the US before the Durbin Amendment, 
where debit transactions were free for most con-
sumers, once these various monthly fees and ad-
ditional fees are taken into account, the average 
cost per debit transaction for Canadian consum-
ers	ranges	between	C$0.27	and	C$0.65	(25–26).
Payment Systems 
out of Balance: 
Two Case Studies 
of Regulation
C anada is not the only country where  politicians have attempted to improve  upon the natural evolution of payment 
systems with less-than-desirable, unintended 
consequences. In this section, we discuss polit-
ical interventions in payment systems in the US 
and Australia.
Canadians pay more for 
banking than Americans but 
get lower quality.
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The Durbin Amendment and 
Price Controls in the US 
Until 2010, debit cards had become an increas-
ingly attractive payment mechanism in the US, 
with various innovations – such as contactless 
cards – being rolled out. As a result, the use of 
debit increased dramatically, and in the fourth 
quarter of 2008, consumers for the first time 
spent more on Visa debit cards than on the net-
work’s credit cards (First Data 2010, 5).
But	 the	 era	 of	 inexpensive,	 high-quality	 debit	
cards came to an end for many consumers with 
the enactment of the Durbin Amendment in 
the US. Included in the 2009 Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the 
Durbin Amendment (named informally after its 
primary sponsor, United States Senator Richard 
Durbin of Illinois), imposed severe price con-
trols on debit card interchange fees. The conse-
quences for consumers – especially low-income 
consumers – and small businesses have been di-
sastrous. The Amendment applies to debit cards 
issued by all banks and credit unions with assets 
of	more	than	$10	billion.
The Durbin Amendment provides that “the 
amount of any interchange transaction fee that 
an issuer may receive or charge with respect to 
an electronic debit transaction shall be reason-
able and proportional to the cost incurred by 
the issuer with respect to the transaction.” The 
statute further required that the calculation of 
“reasonable and proportional” costs should be 
based on only the incremental cost to the issuer 
of a particular transaction (adjusted by enumer-
ated	additional	costs),	excluding	all	other	costs	
associated with debit cards, such as the cost of 
account acquisition, customer service, and other 
costs of running the program that are not at-
tributable to a particular transaction. It then in-
structed the Federal Reserve to issue a regula-
tion	fixing	the	price	of	interchange	accordingly.	
In June 2011 the Federal Reserve issued its reg-
ulation, cutting permissible interchange fees 
to	 $0.21	plus	 5	 basis	 points	 of	 the	 transaction	
value,	 plus	 an	 additional	 $0.01	 for	 fraud	 pro-
tection (Debit Card Interchange Fees and Rout-
ing). The average interchange fee for those 
banks covered by the Durbin Amendment fell 
from	$0.50	to	$0.24	per	transaction	(the	average	
fee	charged	by	exempt	banks	fell,	as	well,	from	
$0.45	to	$0.43)	(Hayashi	2012a,	90–91).	The	net	
effect was to dramatically reduce the average in-
terchange	fee	by	approximately	52	percent	(98).	
For signature-authorized debit transactions, the 
impact was especially large for covered banks, 
as the permissible interchange fee fell from an 
average	 of	 $0.59	 per	 transaction	 to	 $0.24.	 For	
PIN debit the reduction was more modest, from 
$0.34	to	$0.23.	
The Durbin Amendment’s impact has been di-
sastrous for bank consumers.8 Early estimates 
are	that	banks	lost	approximately	$6.6	billion	to	
$8	billion	annually	as	a	result	of	the	interchange	
fee cap (Hubbard 2013, 29). Confronted with a 
loss of billions of dollars in interchange fee reve-
nues, banks and credit unions have made up the 
revenue loss by increasing the cost and reduc-
ing the quality of bank accounts for consumers. 
Some banks initially sought to impose a direct 
fee on debit card usage by consumers – most 
notably an effort by Bank of America to impose 
a	 $5	 monthly	 fee	 on	 debit	 cards.	 In	 response	
to negative customer reaction, Tara Siegel Ber-
nard writing for the New York Times on No-
vember 1, 2011 reports banks largely retreated 
from passing on the loss of revenue directly to 
those who use debit cards, instead recouping 
the losses indirectly through higher bank fees 
and reduced services and access. Most notably, 
access to free chequing – which had increased 
from less than 10 percent of accounts in 2001 
to 76 percent of accounts by 2009 – fell rapidly. 
According to a fall 2012 Bankrate.com study, 
only 39 percent of banks offered free chequing 
accounts (Bell 2012b), down from 45 percent in 
2011, and down by almost half from 76 percent 
in 2009 (Bell 2011). A summer 2012 survey by 
MoneyRates.com found that the percentage of 
Banks lost $6.6–8 billion 
annually due to the Durbin 
Amendment’s interchange  
fee cap.
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accounts with free chequing fell to 35.3 percent, 
down from 38.8 percent a year earlier, and that 
in 2012, only 22 percent of the accounts at large 
banks	 (those	with	more	 than	$25	billion	 in	as-
sets) were still free (Barrington 2013).
Banks also responded by raising other fees and 
tightening eligibility for free chequing. Bank-
rate.com’s 2012 survey found that the average 
monthly service charge on a non-interest-bear-
ing chequing account increased 25 percent from 
2011,	to	$5.48	per	month,	and	that	the	average	
minimum balance needed to avoid a monthly 
service	fee	rose	by	23	percent,	to	$723.02	(with	
some accounts requiring an average minimum 
balance	as	high	as	$5000)	(Bell	2012b).	In	addi-
tion to raising fees, banks reduce costs by reduc-
ing services (such as by closing bank branches 
and laying off workers) (IBC Bank September 
22, 2011) and shedding unprofitable customers. 
But the costs of the Durbin Amendment have 
not been shared uniformly; they have been felt 
much more harshly by low-income consum-
ers	 than	high-income	consumers.	For	example,	
Bank of America’s CEO stated that the bank will 
focus on the top 20 percent of its most profit-
able customers and get rid of the unprofitable 
ones (Bell 2012a). JPMorgan Chase estimated 
that new regulations on overdraft programs and 
price controls on debit card interchange fees 
made unprofitable 70 percent of customers with 
less	 than	$100,000	 in	deposits,	which	required	
the bank either to raise fees, reduce costs and 
services, or shed unprofitable customers, report 
Dan Fitzpatrick and David Enrich in The Wall 
Street Journal, writing on March 1, 2012. One 
industry analyst estimated that if debit card rev-
enues fell 50 percent as a result of the Durbin 
Amendment and overdraft fees fell 30 percent 
as	a	result	of	new	regulations,	approximately	40	
percent of bank customers would become un-
profitable, including most of those with incomes 
under	$40,000	per	year	(Iacobuzio	2010).9 Thus, 
the impact appears to have been highly regres-
sive, an ironic (albeit predictable10) consequence 
of reforms that were supposedly intended to 
benefit consumers.
Lower-income	 and	 younger	 households	 have	
been especially hard hit by the new bank fees that 
have followed in the wake of the Durbin Amend-
ment. Whereas higher-income households can 
avoid the new fees and still retain access to free 
chequing by maintaining sufficient minimum 
balances or using other banks’ services, low-
er-income consumers cannot. Many lower-in-
come consumers have responded by dropping 
out of the banking system. Surveys by the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) sug-
gest that the number of unbanked households 
rose	from	approximately	9	million	(7.7	percent	
of all households) in 200911	to	approximately	10	
million (8.2 percent of all households) in 2010 
(2011, 4). 
To determine the net effect of the Durbin Amend-
ment on consumers, it is necessary to compare 
the increase in the cost of bank accounts for 
consumers against any pass-through of savings 
by merchants to consumers (the primary justifi-
cation offered for the Durbin Amendment). But 
there is no evidence that the windfall to mer-
chants has been passed through to consumers in 
lower prices or higher quality. A survey of mer-
chants by the Electronic Payments Coalition, a 
financial industry supported trade group, found 
no evidence that the decrease in interchange 
fees has been passed on in the form of lower 
retail prices for consumers (2011, 9). Although 
the survey is not scientific, it does reinforce a key 
point noted above: although reductions in inter-
change fee rates are felt immediately by banks 
and passed on to consumers, it is very difficult 
to predict how much and in what manner an in-
terchange fee windfall will be passed on to re-
tail	consumers.	For	example,	it	is	estimated	that	
based	on	a	purchase	of	$40	–	the	average	trans-
action size for a debit card purchase in the US – 
the	cost	savings	to	the	merchant	will	be	approx-
imately	 $0.07	 (Hayashi	 2012a,	 86).	 Thus,	 even	
if the entire savings from the reduction in inter-
change fees were passed on to consumers in the 
form of lower prices, the price difference would 
The costs of the Durbin 
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be so small that few consumers would notice.
Moreover, it was argued that the Durbin Amend-
ment would especially benefit smaller mer-
chants. In practice, many small merchants have 
actually seen interchange fees increase as an 
effect of the Durbin Amendment. Indeed, while 
the Durbin Amendment has provided a wind-
fall	for	the	big	box	retailers	that	lobbied	for	the	
legislation, such as Home Depot,12 it has been a 
debacle for smaller merchants that have actually 
seen their interchange fees rise as a result of the 
Durbin Amendment. 
Prior to the Durbin Amendment, companies 
whose transactions tended to be smaller than 
average paid a special interchange fee that was 
lower than for other industries. In response to 
the Durbin Amendment, however, payment card 
networks eliminated this subsidized rate and de-
cided to charge small firms the same rate as those 
charged to large firms in order to try to recoup 
some of the revenue loss imposed by the Durbin 
Amendment. As a result, many businesses – espe-
cially small businesses that previously had pref-
erential pricing – actually saw their per-transac-
tion interchange fees increase after the Durbin 
Amendment went into effect (Shy 2013, 16). For 
example,	 Redbox	 (which	 rents	DVDs	 from	un-
manned kiosks) announced that it was forced to 
raise	its	prices	for	a	rental	 from	$1.00	to	$1.20	
in response to the higher fees imposed on it as 
a result of the Durbin Amendment. Thus, far 
from receiving the same windfall as stores such 
as Home Depot, many smaller merchants faced 
higher interchange fees, which at least some of 
them passed on to their customers.
The bottom line is that low-income consumers 
must	now	either	pay	upwards	of	$100	per	year	
for a previously free bank account, or pay high 
fees to cheque cashers or for prepaid cards be-
cause they have lost access to a bank account. 
Such consumers will find little solace in the 
empty possibility that they might	save	$0.02	on	
their	next	Big	Mac	if	savings	on	debit	card	inter-
change fees are passed on to consumers in lower 
prices for goods and services. 
Things are likely to become even worse for bank 
customers. In July 2013, in NACS v. Bd. of Gover-
nors of the Fed. Reserve, a US District Court struck 
down the Federal Reserve’s final regulation as 
being insufficiently onerous because it allowed 
issuers	to	recover	some	costs	not	expressly	per-
mitted by the terms of the Durbin Amendment. 
The Court suggested that a proposed earlier ver-
sion of the Fed’s rule, which had essentially per-
mitted	 interchange	 fees	 of	 approximately	 only	
$0.07-$0.12	 per	 transaction,	 would	 be	 more	
consistent with the Durbin Amendment’s restric-
tions. At that level, permissible interchange fees 
for covered banks would be slashed by 80 per-
cent	 or	more,	which	would	 further	 exacerbate	
the consequences of the Durbin Amendment.
Interchange Price Controls in 
Australia
Australia’s	experience	with	interchange	fee	price	
controls is similar to that of the Durbin Amend-
ment. The adverse impact on consumers mani-
fested quickly: First, annual fees increased by an 
average of 22 percent on standard credit cards 
and annual fees for rewards cards increased by 
47–77 percent, costing consumers hundreds of 
millions of dollars in higher annual fees (Still-
man et al. 2008, 13; 15).13 Second, Australian 
card issuers reduced the generosity of their 
reward programs by 23 percent. Third, invest-
ments in innovation by card issuers that would 
have improved card quality likely fell. Fourth, 
by reducing the profitability of transactional us-
ers of credit cards who pay their bill in full each 
month, the interchange fee cap led card issuers 
to pursue a more risky pool of borrowers who 
are more likely to revolve their balances each 
month.
These negative trends for consumers have con-
tinued. A 2012 study by the Payments Policy 
Department concludes that as a result of the 
interchange fee price controls consumers are 
Interchange fees rose for many 
smaller merchants as a result 
of the Durbin Amendment.
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paying higher fees for lower-quality credit cards, 
noting that “Overall reward points and other 
benefits earned from spending on credit cards 
have become less generous while annual fees to 
cardholders have increased” (Chan, Chong, and 
Mitchell 2012). In short, Australian consumers 
on average are unambiguously paying more and 
getting less as a result of the RBA’s price controls. 
In addition, because the RBA’s price controls ap-
ply only to four-party credit card schemes but 
not	 three-party	 systems	 such	 as	 American	 Ex-
press and Diners Club, its interventions have dis-
torted the competitive marketplace, prompting a 
growth	in	three-party	schemes	at	the	expense	of	
Visa and MasterCard. The regulatory tipping of 
the competitive marketplace serves no coherent 
economic function because three-party schemes 
charge a merchant discount that is the functional 
equivalent of an interchange fee in a four-party 
scheme and serves the identical function of 
balancing the two sides of the market (Zywicki 
2010, 29). But the result is more than econom-
ically illogical – it has actually had perverse re-
sults	because	American	Express	and	Diners	Club	
typically charge higher merchant discounts than 
Visa or MasterCard. As Chan, Chong, and Mitch-
ell observe, “Merchants largely bear the cost of 
these more generous rewards cards through the 
higher	 merchant	 service	 fees	 for	 American	 Ex-
press products, on average, unless they choose 
to pass that cost back through to cardholders in 
the form of a surcharge” (2012).
RBA price controls encourage use of three-party 
systems with higher merchant discounts.
But while interchange fees and the value of re-
wards have fallen on average, this decline has 
not been uniform: the authors report that the 
damage has been much greater to lower-income 
consumers – card issuers have actually increased 
interchange fees for high-end platinum/pre-
mium cards and reduced interchange fees for 
standard cards. The authors note that the RBA’s 
rules have created incentives for card schemes 
to encourage their issuers “to promote cards as-
sociated with higher costs” (2012). As a result, 
“There has … been a substantial increase in the 
number of platinum card products on offer to 
cardholders, with some banks replacing their 
existing	 gold	 cards	 with	 platinum	 cards	 and	 a	
number of merchant-branded platinum cards 
also introduced” (2012). In fact, in 2009 both 
MasterCard and Visa introduced new super-pre-
mium cards “with an even higher interchange 
fee” and even more generous rewards aimed at 
this most profitable group of customers with the 
highest spending levels. As in the US, some mer-
chants have also introduced their own premium 
credit cards that offer substantial benefits and 
subsidies to favored customers with no indica-
tion that they charge those customers a higher 
price for the higher costs that they presumably 
impose.14 As noted above, the regressive impact 
of Australia’s price controls is consistent with 
the	US	experience	with	the	Durbin	Amendment,	
which has fallen much more harshly on low-in-
come consumers than the wealthy.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Australia’s 
cap on interchange fees – the longest-lasting 
experiment	to	date	with	regulating	interchange	
fees – resulted in lower retail prices for consum-
ers (Gans and King 2003, 462; 471–472). While 
several authors have claimed that retail prices 
have fallen as a result of Australia’s imposition of 
interchange price controls on credit cards, there 
remains an absence of any real evidence to sup-
port this assertion. Indeed, the authors of the 
RBA’s 2012 report simply assert, without a single 
shred of empirical evidence, that the benefit to 
merchants is “likely to have been passed on to 
all consumers, not just those who pay by credit 
card” (Chan, Chong, and Mitchell 2012). After al-
most	a	full	decade	of	experience	with	price	con-
trols, this inability to document any evidence of 
the size of any alleged pass-through to retail con-
sumers is astonishing. In light of the demonstra-
ble adverse impact on consumers from higher 
cost and lower-quality credit cards as a result of 
the RBA’s price controls, that the Bank can still 
blithely assert that retail consumers have ben-
RBA price controls encourage 
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efited, with no hard evidence to support that 
claim, borders on the irresponsible. 
Moreover, even if the RBA is correct to assert 
that some merchant savings have been passed 
through to retail consumers, that is only part of 
the story. Any proper assessment of the welfare 
impact on consumers requires a comparison of 
purported lower retail prices with higher credit 
card prices, yet the authors of the RBA study, 
and the RBA itself, simply ignore that fundamen-
tal question. The unsupported claim by the RBA 
that “all consumers” have “likely” benefited from 
lower retail prices would only be true if the total 
pass-through of merchant savings to retail con-
sumers	exceeds	the	additional	costs	to	consum-
ers from higher fees and reduced card quality. 
That too is an empirical question – and one on 
which the RBA and other proponents of price 
controls have provided no evidence.
The	Latest	Effort	
to Regulate in 
Canada: Targeting 
the Honour-All-
Cards and No-
Surcharge Rules
P ayment system operators enforce a range  of rules that govern the use of cards on  their networks by customers, merchants, 
acquirers, and the like.15 These rules are de-
signed to ensure the proper functioning of the 
network, and they impose restrictions that bene-
fit all participants, not only merchants. But mer-
chants have focused upon only two of these rules 
(MasterCard’s rules run a few hundred pages, 
and only a small portion apply to merchants at 
all) to argue that they are being systematically 
harmed. The reality is quite different, however.
Among many other things, network rules stip-
ulate that merchants not impose a surcharge 
on transactions made using their systems and 
that merchants accept all cards on a particular 
network if they accept any – the co-called “hon-
our-all-cards” rule. These rules have come under 
considerable fire and retailers have called for 
regulation prohibiting the rules (Cowan 2013). 
The NDP (Thibeault 2013, 4) and the Competi-
tion Bureau (Canada (Director of Investigation 
and Research) v. Bank of Montreal et al.) have 
joined the retailers in seeking prohibition of the 
rules. 
The Honour-All-Cards Rule
The honour-all-cards rule of payment card net-
works is frequently criticized by merchants, 
particularly with respect to premium cards that 
have higher interchange fees for consumers. The 
“rule” is actually two interrelated rules: an “hon-
our-all-products” rule that prohibits merchants 
from accepting some but not all cards issued 
under the network brand and a related “hon-
our-all-issuers” rule that requires merchants to 
accept cards issued by all issuers under a given 
logo. Essentially, the rule requires that if a mer-
chant wants to receive the benefits of participat-
ing in a particular network, it must accept all 
cards issued under the network’s logo and may 
not pick and choose which type of cards or issu-
ers within the network it will accept and which 
it will refuse.
Although contested by merchants, the hon-
our-all-cards rule is essential for a well-function-
ing payments network. Payment cards are useful 
to consumers only if they know that their cards 
will be accepted at any store that accepts a par-
ticular network’s products. It would defeat the 
purpose of a payment card network if a con-
sumer who saw a MasterCard logo could learn 
later that his particular MasterCard product, or 
After 10 years of price  
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that a card issued by his particular issuer bank, 
would not be accepted by a merchant that oth-
erwise participated in the MasterCard network. 
Both the Visa and MasterCard networks are 
consortiums of many different banks, both as 
issuers and acquirers. The central purpose of 
the payment networks is to link together these 
thousands of issuer and acquirer banks into a 
network that provides assurance for consum-
ers and merchants that they will be able to pay 
and be paid within the system. The honour-all-
cards rule, therefore, is integral to the networks 
functioning by assuring consumers that any mer-
chant operating within the card network will ac-
cept their cards.
As a result, honour-all-cards rules have been an 
essential part of the Visa and MasterCard net-
works from the beginning.16 And if Canada were 
to acquiesce to merchants’ efforts to prohibit the 
rule, it would be the first and only jurisdiction in 
the	world	to	do	so	(Lipman	2010).
The essential role of an honour-all-cards rule 
within the payment card system can be illus-
trated by the mirror-image rule that emerged on 
the other side of the market, the “honour-all-pa-
per” rule, which assures merchants (and their 
acquirers) that they will be paid (Evans 2011, 
11–14). Consider if a merchant chose to accept 
payment for a Chase Visa card, but a particular 
issuing bank refused to honour payments to a 
particular merchant or acquirer. If the issuer 
could pick and choose which merchant’s pay-
ments it would honour, then this would obvi-
ously reduce the value to the merchant of partic-
ipating in the payment network – and the value 
of the network itself. It is only by simultaneously 
requiring that merchants ”honour all cards” to 
protect consumers, while also requiring that 
banks “honour all paper” to protect merchants, 
that the network can function effectively. 
It is also worth noting that the honour-all-paper 
rule is instrumental in the incredible fraud pro-
tection that payment networks confer on mer-
chants. Because banks must honour all appro-
priately processed payments – even if they turn 
out to be fraudulent – merchants are not on the 
hook for the costs of fraudulent transactions. 
This confers enormous benefit on merchants – a 
benefit balanced in small part by the honour-all-
cards rule, which ensures that banks benefit 
from their participation in the payment network 
even as they bear the significant costs of fraudu-
lent payments.17
In turn, the system of “default” interchange 
prices is the mechanism by which the card net-
work determines the financial flows among these 
various actors in the system. Thus, just as issuing 
banks cannot refuse to accept presentations for 
payment from particular merchants or acquirers, 
merchants that choose to participate in a partic-
ular network cannot refuse to accept payment 
from a particular issuer or product. Absent an 
honour-all-cards rule (and the corollary hon-
our-all-paper rule), the entire payments network 
could unravel. Once the interchange fee for a 
particular issuer and product is approved by the 
payments network, it makes little sense to allow 
merchants to revisit the question of whether, in 
its opinion, the fee that has been approved is too 
high or whether the issuer meets the merchant’s 
standards. Rather, this is what the network is for.
The No-Surcharge Rule
Payment networks also generally prohibit mer-
chants from imposing surcharges on payment 
card transactions, even though the same net-
works do generally permit merchants to offer 
discounts for cash.18 Again the rule serves the 
overall purposes of the network by assuring con-
sumers who shop at an outlet that accepts their 
preferred payment card that the consumer’s 
choice of payment method will not result in the 
consumer paying more	 than	 the	 posted	 or	 ex-
pected price for any goods she purchases. 
Because a no-surcharge rule has been adopted 
in	 some	 jurisdictions	 we	 have	 more	 experi-
No nation currently  
prohibits honour-all-cards 
rules.
Ian Lee, Geoffrey A. Manne, Julian Morris, and Todd J. Zywicki  |  October 2013 21
ence with its effects. The Interac Consent Order 
prohibited Interac members from including a 
no-surcharge rule. Perhaps because merchant 
agreements with credit card issuers still prohibit 
surcharging in Canada, surcharging has not been 
undertaken systematically. However, the Com-
petition Bureau’s recent case against Visa and 
MasterCard was based in part on claims that no-
surcharge rules were anticompetitive, harming 
merchants and consumers alike. Moreover, the 
NDP recently proposed to introduce a similar 
measure for Canadian credit cards. So it is worth 
considering the impact of surcharging restric-
tions in other jurisdictions.
In Australia, Qantas Airlines implemented a sur-
charge on credit card users, but did not reduce 
prices for those paying by cash or cheque, re-
sulting in higher costs for credit card users but 
no price reduction for others (Stillman et al. 
2008, 29). Moreover, the surcharges have been 
set not by the actual costs imposed by cards, 
but by what the market will bear: According to 
a November 25, 2009 New York Times article by 
Kevin Bradsher, one traveler taking a family trip 
paid a whopping 5.6 percent surcharge to buy a 
plane	ticket	using	his	credit	card,	far	exceeding	
the interchange fee charged on the transaction. 
More generally, it has been noted that “[i]n Aus-
tralia and the UK, some merchants are now im-
posing	surcharges	 that	exceed	 their	acceptance	
costs or are imposing surcharges in nontranspar-
ent ways” (Hayashi 2012b, 3). These problems 
“tend to be concentrated in certain industries or 
payment channels, such as online transactions in 
Australia and the travel sector in the UK.”19
The willingness of a merchant to surcharge, there-
fore, appears to be only coincidentally related 
to whether a particular payment system actually 
costs more than alternatives. Instead, it is more 
likely related to consumers’ price sensitivity for 
particular payment systems, rather than costs. If 
that is true, and merchants are surcharging op-
portunistically,	 one	 would	 expect	 to	 find	 sur-
charging in those markets where payment cards 
are used most and especially those for which 
payment	cards	are	used	almost	exclusively.	Thus,	
under this view, above-cost surcharging should 
be most prevalent in industries such as airline 
tickets, hotels, and online shopping, for which 
virtually all payments are made by payment cards 
and for which cash (and usually cheques) is not 
a	viable	substitute.	And	that	 is	exactly	what	has	
happened. There is no evidence that card accep-
tance costs are uniquely high in these industries 
yet the evidence unambiguously demonstrates 
that merchants are surcharging above their net 
costs of card acceptance. In turn, this evidence 
of abusive surcharging has led to calls for still 
further political intervention to limit surcharg-
ing in both the UK and Australia to cost-based 
surcharging (Hayashi 2012b, 3) – although with-
out apparent appreciation for the irony that sur-
charging is most prevalent in those industries 
where payment card usage is virtually universal.
But the tendency of merchants to surcharge 
according to elasticity of demand for payment 
cards rather than cost raises still another diffi-
culty: as the relative cost of various payment sys-
tems changes over time, this will also change the 
efficient surcharge level. And unless regulators 
constantly monitor and revise their allowable 
surcharging levels (which also vary from industry 
to industry), the problem of abusive surcharging 
will arise again, with the potential to harm con-
sumers and the economy. 
For	example,	in	the	Netherlands	merchants	rou-
tinely surcharge for sales amounts below €10–15 
(Bolt, Jonker, and van Rensellar 2008, 7). This 
surcharging has had observable effects of dra-
matically reducing the usage of payment cards 
for low-value transactions. One study, based on 
estimates of costs in 2002, suggested that this 
surcharging pattern may have been efficient: 
the “break even” point for the net social costs of 
payment cards versus cash was at that time esti-
mated to be €11.63 (9).20 On the other hand, as 
a result of technology and improved processing 
speed, between just 2002 and 2005/2006, the 
relative cost of payment cards versus cash was 
halved. Moreover, since that time, it is likely that 
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the breakeven point has fallen still further, as 
processing speeds have become still faster. By 
contrast, there have been few similar technolog-
ical innovations in the handling of cash, and as 
the total cost of employee time has risen over 
time,	the	cost	of	cash	handling	has	experienced	
no similar decline.
Nevertheless, as the authors of the Netherlands 
study note, even though the breakeven point for 
cash versus card transactions fell from about €11 
to €5, the threshold at which merchants imposed 
surcharges did not (23). This meant that mer-
chants were surcharging many debit card trans-
actions for which debit cards were in fact less ex-
pensive than cash transactions, thereby shifting 
many consumers to an inefficient use of cash. 
The authors of the study concluded that the so-
cial cost of this inefficient surcharging might be 
more than €50 million (22). This indicates that 
the claim by retailers that they must surcharge to 
recoup their costs is disingenuous: although the 
relative cost of payment cards declined over time 
they have continued to surcharge at the same 
threshold rate as they did previously.
In	 addition,	 as	 noted	 above,	 there	 is	 extensive	
debate over whether, in fact, debit cards are on 
net	more	expensive	than	cash	once	all	merchant	
benefits (including faster throughput and ticket 
lift) are included. Moreover, even while the the-
oretical case for allowing surcharging is strong, 
there remains the additional practical problem of 
determining the appropriate price for surcharg-
ing and preventing merchant opportunism.
An alternative to merchant surcharging for pay-
ment cards is for merchants to offer discounted 
prices to those who use cash. Given that mer-
chants are able to discount for cash – which is 
economically identical to surcharging for card 
usage – why do they insist on having the right 
to impose surcharges for payment cards in ad-
dition? The most plausible answer is that mer-
chants recognize that by marking products with 
a lower price on the shelves and then imposing 
a higher price through a surcharge at the reg-
ister, they can ambush consumers with higher 
prices	after	the	consumer	has	already	expended	
the time and energy to pick out their purchases 
and thus are unlikely to return the products to 
the shelves at that point of the transaction. 
The difference between a cash discount and a 
surcharge on cards is precisely that cash dis-
counting is more transparent to the consumer, 
whereas consumers don’t realize that they are 
being forced to pay a higher price for card us-
age until they are at the checkout register. If 
merchants demonstrate a greater willingness 
to impose card surcharges than cash discounts, 
the	most	likely	explanation	is	the	relatively	non
-transparent ambush dynamic of surcharging, 
as opposed to the more-transparent consumer-
friendly dynamic of cash discounts. The primary 
beneficiaries of any surcharge are merchants, 
not consumers. In the October 7, 2013 issue 
of The Star,	Dana	Flavelle	writes	that	reality	ex-
plains why the Consumer Council of Canada is 
reported to have responded enthusiastically to 
the recent decision of the Competition Tribunal 
to dismiss the case against Visa and MasterCard, 
noting that it will prevent “price surprises” at the 
checkout.
In some situations, such as a restaurant, the con-
sumer may have no choice but to acquiesce to a 
surcharge after the meal has already been pre-
pared	and	consumed.	Likewise,	as	noted	in	the	
examples	 above,	 merchants	 offering	 more	 ex-
pensive goods – for which the use of credit cards 
are likely the only solution – are likely to abuse 
their position opportunistically. Given the lack of 
evidence that forcibly reducing interchange fees 
leads to substantially lower prices for consumers 
in the first place, it seems especially unlikely that 
permitting surcharging of payment card custom-
ers will result in lower prices for cash customers, 
as opposed to simply higher prices for payment 
card customers.
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The Cost of  
Cash
To put it in succinct and current terms, 
money’s destiny is to become digital. 
This general conclusion emerges from an 
examination of money’s long historical 
record and its likely relationship to future 
socioeconomic changes. Historically, 
money has been on the path towards 
greater abstraction, or pure symbolic 
representation disassociated from a precise 
physical materialisation, for millennia.
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT (2002, 7) 
T he inordinate attention given to the cost  of credit and debit cards in recent years  in Canada, the US, and elsewhere im-
plicitly assumes that cash is a less costly form 
of payment. Indeed, surveys of merchants by 
the Bank of Canada (Arango, Hogg, and Lee 
2012) confirm that most small business owners 
prefer cash to credit and debit cards because 
they believe there is virtually no cost to cash.
The numbers tell a different story. In particular, 
various studies show that cash has a significant 
number of hidden costs – private and social – 
to business and society. These were succinctly 
summarized in a Tufts University Fletcher 
School IBGC study by Bhaskar Chakravorti and 
Benjamin D. Mazzota published in September 
2013, which we detail below.
Cost of Cash for Consumer 
Consumers seeking to use cash face significant 
costs in the form of fees for using automated 
teller machines (ATMs) not owned by their own 
bank. In the US, ATM fees were $8 billion in 2012. 
In addition, consumers face transportation and 
opportunity costs relating to the time taken to 
visit ATMs or a bank branch. Furthermore, the 
Tufts study estimated the cost of theft from in-
dividuals at $500 million a year (2013). 
Cost of Cash to Business
The costs to businesses of accepting cash as a 
payment instrument are much higher than for 
consumers. A 2012 ECB study found that almost 
50 percent of the cost of the payments system 
falls on businesses, with cash payments being 
the single largest driver of costs (Schmiedel, 
Kostova, and Ruttenberg 2012). Moreover, the 
various central bank studies involved with the 
ECB study found that the payment system cost 
almost 1 percent of GDP with cash representing 
the largest single component (2012).
The Tufts study found that “cash costs and 
management processes differ greatly across 
firm size” (2013). Large firms invest in secu-
rity systems to a much greater degree than 
do small businesses. Smaller firms effectively 
“self-insure” by not investing in secure systems 
but this obviously leaves them more exposed 
to “shrinkage” – losses due to theft. The Tufts 
study estimated annual losses due to cash theft 
at approximately $40 billion in the US (2013). 
A 2012 study by PricewaterhouseCoopers es-
timated total annual shrinkage in Canada to be 
$4 billion, with the largest amount due to em-
ployee theft. But cash imposes additional bur-
dens not included in these estimates, including 
the need to double count all cash (to reduce 
shrinkage), the cost of bonding insurance 
against theft, and the cost of internal audit to 
detect and prevent employee theft.  
Cost of Cash to Government 
The most important cost to government of cash 
is that it facilitates illegal transactions. Dealers 
in illegal drugs, terrorists, and other criminals 
typically do not accept credit or debit cards 
because they are traceable. The Tufts study es-
timated the lost tax revenues to the US Govern-
ment at $100 billion a year (2013); in 2012, the 
IRS estimated the annual tax gap much higher, 
at $385 Billion in lost revenues. In addition, the 
cost of production and distribution of cash was 
estimated at $1.2 billion for 2012.
Summary
In sum, cash has significant private and social 
costs, many of which are “hidden” as they are 
classified as “insurance,” “shrinkage,” ATM fees, 
robbery, theft, or uncollected taxes. 
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Understanding 
the Effects of 
Regulation: 
Cross-Subsidies, 
“Fairness,” and 
Pass-Through of 
Fees
F undamental to the assessment of the costs  and benefits of these various regulatory  regimes – as well as the purported justi-
fications for them – is an understanding of how 
costs, benefits, and prices (fees) are allocated 
throughout the system. Most importantly and, 
unfortunately, most complicatedly, is an under-
standing of how the imposition (or regulation) 
of fees affects the broader distribution of costs 
and benefits. 
A Transfer to Merchants or 
Consumers – and Which 
Consumers?
Merchants argue that interchange fees, which 
they agree to pay for the value and convenience 
of accepting cards, raise their costs of doing 
business and that they must, in turn, pass this 
cost on to their customers.21 But the costs of 
the payment system must be paid somewhere in 
the value chain, allocated in some way among 
banking consumers, banks (and their share-
holders and employees), merchants (and their 
shareholders and employees), and merchant 
customers. How the costs of operating the pay-
ment card system end up being allocated among 
these various groups depends on a number of 
complicated factors that vary significantly among 
different industries.
From the perspective of consumers, however, 
the	 relevant	 tradeoff	 is	 evident:	 to	what	extent	
are the costs of the payment system (including 
interchange fees) borne by banks’ customers on 
the one hand and, on the other, merchants’ cus-
tomers? In other words, if interchange fees were 
forcibly reduced to a level below that prevailing 
in a free market, would the increase in prices and 
reduction	 in	quality	 to	bank	 customers	 exceed	
the decrease in price to merchants’ customers?
Answering this question entails an assessment 
of	 the	extent	 to	which	businesses	pass	cost	 in-
creases and reductions on to their customers. 
Unfortunately, measuring the pass-through of 
cost changes to consumers is difficult.22 Never-
theless, by making some generalizations among 
different industries, it is possible to determine 
the relative degree of pass-through. And there is 
strong reason to believe that the pass-through 
of cost savings to merchant customers is likely 
small compared to the commensurate increase 
in price imposed on bank customers.
A recent paper by David Evans and Abel Mateus 
points out, to begin with, that a “price cap that 
lowers the interchange [fee] can affect the con-
tracts between
1.  the acquirer and the merchant as a result of 
the acquirer’s costs going down;
2.  the merchant and the consumer as a result of 
the merchant’s costs going down;
3.  the network and the acquirer as a result of the 
acquirer’s costs going down;
4.  the issuer and the cardholder as a result of 
the issuer’s revenue going down; and
5.  the network and the issuer as a result of the 
issuer’s revenue going down” (Evans and Ma-
teus 2011, 11–12).
In each of these relationships in the payment 
system chain the parties can, must, and do adjust 
both	prices	 and	 services	 in	 response	 to	exoge-
Would interchange fee caps 
push prices low enough to  
offset higher banking costs? 
Probably not.
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nous adjustments to the relationship. But even 
this	fails	to	convey	the	full	complexity	of	the	sys-
tem and the difficulty in ensuring that interven-
tion is welfare enhancing. Among many other 
things, it is also the case that:
•	 	Some	 cardholders	 and	 some	merchants	 (to	
say nothing of others outside the four-party 
system) are borrowers from both acquiring 
and issuing banks and the terms of these re-
lationships may be affected by banks’ cost of 
capital going up. 
•	 	Some	of	these	borrowers	borrow	in	the	form	
of revolving credit, and the terms of these ar-
rangements may be affected by banks’ reve-
nues changing. 
•	 	Some	 of	 these	 same	 participants	 are	 share-
holders in those banks, and some consumers 
and banks are shareholders in merchants’ 
companies, and these relationships will be af-
fected by banks’ and merchants’ revenues or 
costs going down (or up). 
•	 	Moreover,	 cardholders	 very	 often	 interact	
with each other, and merchants with consum-
ers, through cash and cheque transactions, 
and the relative cost of these transactions 
will be affected by changes in these other 
relationships. 
As Evans and Mateus discuss, the most impor-
tant	determinant	of	 the	extent	of	 the	effect	on	
these relationships from a change in the inter-
change	 fee	(or	any	cost)	 is	 the	extent	of	“pass-
through”	–	the	extent	to	which	changes	in	costs	
to merchants and banks are absorbed by them or 
shared a) with merchants on the part of acquir-
ing banks, b) cardholders on the part of issuing 
banks, and c) cardholders and other customers 
on the part of the merchants (12–18). On aver-
age, the rate of pass-through is about 50 percent, 
meaning competition induces retailers (whether 
banks or merchants) to pass on only about half 
of their cost savings. At the same time, studies 
demonstrate that even this pass-through is not 
immediate, and prices tend not to change at all 
for a year or more following a cost change (15–
16; 45–48). Studies also suggest that very small 
cost changes may not be passed on at all. In this 
context,	 recall	 that	 one	 estimate	places	 the	 to-
tal cost saving to a merchant from the Durbin 
Amendment	at	a	minuscule	$0.07	on	an	average-
sized transaction.
For merchants, the analysis is similar: pass-
through rates will vary substantially depending 
on the particular competitive conditions facing 
each industry and each merchant. More impor-
tant, the overall effect on consumers (and the 
overall cost saving for merchants) will depend 
on	the	relative	mix	of	debit,	credit,	cheque,	cash,	
prepaid cards, and other payment technologies, 
as costs savings would arise only from transac-
tions that would have incurred an interchange 
fee – certainly not all transactions.23
Overall,	 for	 consumers	 the	 experience	 in	 Aus-
tralia and the US suggests that price controls on 
interchange fees provide significant windfall cost 
reductions to merchants and significant cost in-
creases to bank consumers – with no evidence 
of any corresponding pass-through of merchant 
savings to consumers, much less in amounts 
sufficient to outweigh the massive increases in 
costs to bank consumers. In short, there is no 
evidence at all – none – to support the belief 
that consumers as a group, much less low-in-
come consumers, benefit from price controls on 
interchange fees or permitting merchants to im-
pose higher costs through surcharging consum-
ers for the convenience of using a payment card 
instead of cash. Moreover, at the risk of being 
redundant, it should be remembered that even 
this	calculus	excludes	the	social	costs	of	greater	
cash	usage,	such	as	higher	risks	of	crime	and	tax	
evasion, not to mention the harm to consumers 
and society from an increased number of con-
sumers who lose access to credit cards and are 
thus forced to turn to alternative lenders such as 
payday lenders, pawnbrokers, and the like.
Back to Mechanics:  
The Distribution of Costs  
and Benefits and the Boston 
Fed Study
Proponents of interchange fee price caps and 
other invasive regulations often cite a controver-
sial study (Thibeault 2013, 2; Task Force for the 
Payments System Review 2011, 14) published 
by the Boston Federal Reserve Bank (the “Bos-
ton Fed Study”) (Schuh, Shy, and Stavins 2010). 
This study purportedly demonstrates that lower-
ing interchange fees would increase social wel-
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fare (and fairness) by transferring wealth from 
card-paying households to cash-paying house-
holds and from high-income households to 
low-income households. 
Premium cards, which offer rewards and other 
benefits to users, typically have higher inter-
change fee rates than normal cards and are typ-
ically used by high-income consumers, while 
lower-income consumers are less likely to use 
credit cards. Proponents of regulation argue that 
these higher fees, when passed on to consum-
ers, effect a systematic transfer of wealth from 
poorer, mostly-cash consumers to wealthy, pre-
mium-card using consumers.
Applying a number of highly-contestable as-
sumptions, the Boston Fed study finds that the 
current credit card system in the US produces 
a	 small	 annual	 wealth	 transfer	 of	 $8–$21	 dol-
lars from low-income households and a positive 
wealth	 transfer	 of	 $430–$750	 to	 high	 income	
households, depending on how those categories 
are defined.24 The Boston Fed study claims that 
this transfer occurs because low-income house-
holds are more likely to use cash payments for 
point-of-sale purchases, whereas high-income 
consumers are more likely to use credit cards. 
Moreover, higher-income consumers are more 
likely to use rewards cards, which typically fea-
ture a higher interchange fee than standard 
credit cards. Because merchants are not permit-
ted to surcharge those who use premium cards 
for the higher interchange fee the merchant in-
curs upon acceptance, these higher interchange 
fees are considered to be a cost of business that 
is passed on to all consumers equally in the form 
of higher prices, including cash users. The au-
thors conclude that in order to eliminate this 
transfer from low-income to high-income con-
sumers, it is necessary to impose price controls 
on interchange fees, which will force card issu-
ers to scale back rewards and other benefits.
Problems with the Boston  
Fed Study’s Methodology
While special interests seeking political inter-
vention into the payment cards market have 
touted	 the	 study	 extensively,	 economists	 have	
been	extremely	 critical	of	 its	methodology	and	
conclusions. In particular, the study’s estimates 
rest on a number of crucial but highly question-
able assumptions. In light of the of the relatively 
small size of the alleged transfers from lower-in-
come	 consumers	 ($8–$21	 depending	 on	 how	
those categories are defined) (Schuh, Shy, and 
Stavins 2010, 16), if these assumptions are erro-
neous at all it could lead to a disappearance of 
the reported effects, and indeed, under equally 
reasonable alternative assumptions it is quite 
plausible that the status quo in the US actually 
reflects a positive benefit to consumers.
First, and most important, the Boston Fed stu-
dy’s finding of a net loss by low-income consum-
ers rests on the assumption that all of the cost 
saving by merchants from reduced interchange 
fees will be passed on to retail consumers in 
the form of lower prices. But, as noted, it is an 
open question how much of the cost savings will 
be passed through by merchants to consumers. 
Astonishingly, however, the Boston Fed study 
assumes a 100 percent pass-through rate for 
savings on merchant fees to consumers, a cru-
cial assumption utterly lacking in any empirical 
support.25 The authors defend this assumption, 
stating, “the validity of these assumptions is an 
empirical mater and the data needed to verify 
them are not available.” But as discussed above, 
this statement is not accurate. Moreover, even if 
it were true, there is no defensible reason to use 
a 100 percent pass-through assumption. 
Both economic theory and available empirical 
evidence make clear that complete pass-through 
is not a realistic assumption. A 100 percent pass-
through rate implies what economists call a 
“horizontal supply curve.” To understand this, 
it helps to imagine the interchange fee as a sales 
tax.	Typically,	we	understand	 that	 some	of	 the	
incidence	of	 a	 tax	 falls	 on	 suppliers	 and	 some	
The Boston Fed study finds 
an annual wealth transfer 
of $8–21 from low-income 
households.
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on consumers, in amounts that are determined 
by each group’s sensitivity to price. Usually, in 
the	face	of	a	tax	increase,	consumers	(now	effec-
tively faced with higher prices) would consume 
less. Suppliers, however, would respond by low-
ering the underlying price of goods somewhat 
to offset the effect, arriving at a new equilibrium 
price and level of output that splits the effect of 
the	 tax	between	consumers	and	sellers.	 If	 sup-
pliers are more sensitive to price changes than 
consumers,	they	will	absorb	less	of	the	tax	(low-
ering the underlying price of their goods by a 
smaller amount) and pass-through more of the 
tax	increase	to	consumers.	If	they	are	completely 
sensitive to price (supply is said to be “perfectly 
elastic”),	 they	will	 absorb	 none	 of	 the	 tax	 and	
will receive the same amount of surplus (profit) 
on every sale. Retail prices would stay the same, 
but consumers would face higher effective 
prices (equivalent to full retail price plus the full 
amount	of	the	tax).	Retailers	would	sell	less,	as	
a result, but would receive the same profit on 
each sale. This is what 100 percent pass-through 
implies.
There are two things glaringly wrong with this 
assumption. First, it would mean that suppli-
ers (merchants) actually earn no surplus; they 
would be completely indifferent to factors that 
affect prices in their markets. But merchants 
have	 lobbied	 hard,	 expending	 enormous	 re-
sources, to convince politicians to force down 
interchange fees. This would make no sense in 
a world of 100 percent pass-through. The far 
more	realistic	explanation	 for	 this	 rent	seeking	
is that merchants (particularly the larger mer-
chants who have been responsible for most of 
the lobbying) enjoy some pricing power and do 
not pass through 100 percent of their costs. But 
in this case, the consumer benefits from inter-
change fee reductions estimated in the Boston 
Fed Study based on a 100 percent pass-through 
assumption are faulty. 
Translated	back	into	the	context	of	interchange	
fees, 100 percent pass-through would mean that 
the full amount of current interchange fees (mer-
chant costs, which would lower profits if paid 
by the merchants themselves) is already being 
borne by consumers in the form of higher prices 
so that merchants receive the same amount of 
surplus on each sale regardless of the amount of 
the interchange fee. It also means that any reduc-
tion in interchange fees (merchant costs) would 
be passed on entirely to consumers in the form 
of lower prices – again, ensuring merchants re-
ceive the same profit per sale, but not any ad-
ditional profit from their reduction in costs. 
But, as noted, this conclusion is impossible to 
maintain in the face of merchant lobbying for 
lower interchange fees. It simply isn’t plausible 
that merchants would incur enormous lobbying 
expenses	simply	to	confer	benefits	on	their	cus-
tomers without receiving a penny in return.
Second, in the Boston Fed Study paper, the set 
of	merchants	studied	represents	$5.6	trillion	of	
economic	activity	in	the	context	of	the	US	econ-
omy. A sector of that size can only be called “very 
large,”	which	means	that	we	should	expect	the	
merchants’ market to have increasing costs, 
even over the long run.26 In turn, this means 
that the merchants’ supply curve must slope up-
ward – which means both that the supply curve 
cannot be horizontal and that there must be 
only partial pass-through of bank fees. There is 
simply no plausible economic argument for the 
proposition that a substantial fraction of the US 
economy can be treated as constant-cost.
Of course this is what the empirical evidence 
demonstrates: that pass-through rates are around 
50 percent and, even then, pass-through will oc-
cur only gradually and little pass-through would 
be	expected	during	the	first	18–24	months	after	
merchant fees were reduced (Evans and Mateus 
2011, 15–16).
What is most remarkable is that, at this level of 
pass-through, the transfer from low-income to 
high-income identified in the study actually re-
verses. In a revised version of their paper, the 
authors of the Boston Fed Study admit that, for 
any wealth transfer to occur, the pass-through 
Actual pass-through rates are 
around 50 percent and take 
two years to appear.
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rate by merchants must be greater than 50 per-
cent. As the authors, note, “as pass-through of 
the payment costs to retail prices falls below 50 
percent, the transfer reverses and become pro-
gressive” (Schuh, Shy, and Stavins 2010, 4) Thus, 
once the unrealistic 100 percent pass-through 
assumption is replaced with a more accurate 
pass-through estimate, the entire consumer pro-
tection basis for interchange fee regulation dis-
appears, and may in fact suggest consumer ben-
efits from increasing interchange rates. 
In fact, in the revised version of the paper, the au-
thors, using a more complicated methodology, 
estimate that the average cash-paying household 
pays	a	transfer	of	only	$50	annually,	rather	than	
the	 $149	 reported	 in	 the	 original	 study.	While	
the revised study shows a greater average trans-
fer	 from	 low-income	 households	 ($83	 instead	
of	$8),	as	noted	above,	this	is	sensitive	to	pass-
through rates (and other assumptions in the pa-
per).	The	$83	number	is	based	on	a	100	percent	
pass-through assumption that is irrelevant to re-
al-world policy.
Moreover, the Boston Fed study fails to account 
for fact that interchange fees actually increased 
for many merchants after the Durbin Amend-
ment went into effect, especially small mer-
chants that make a disproportionate number of 
small transactions. Moreover, it seems plausible 
that lower-income consumers would be overrep-
resented among those who patronize fast food 
restaurants,	 for	 example,	 relative	 to	 high-in-
come consumers. Thus, whereas a high-class 
steakhouse	might	have	experienced	a	reduction	
in its interchange fees as a result of the Durbin 
Amendment, a small deli or fast food restaurant 
likely saw its interchange fees increase. On the 
other hand, this result should not be surprising: 
it has been long-recognized that price controls 
on consumer credit products (such as usury ceil-
ings on interest rates) typically result in a wealth 
transfer from low-income to higher-income con-
sumers (Zywicki 2000, 158–159).
Beyond this, the Boston Fed study’s conclusions 
are based on its particular assumptions about 
the overlap in retail shopping behavior between 
high-income and low-income consumers. For 
a transfer to occur as described by the study’s 
authors, it would have to come from the same 
merchants, imposing higher costs indiscrimi-
nately on both their high-income and low-in-
come (cash and credit) customers. But it is obvi-
ous that although high-income and low-income 
households sometimes shop at the same retail 
establishments, they often also shop at different 
stores. Thus, the Boston Fed study’s conclusions 
are highly dependent on the degree of overlap 
between low and high-income consumers at 
the	same	stores.	If,	to	use	an	extreme	example,	
only low income consumers shopped at Wal-
mart and only high-income consumers shopped 
at Neiman Marcus, then even if they relied on 
completely different payments there would be 
no redistributive effect. The original Boston Fed 
study seems to ignore this dynamic, and implic-
itly assumes a 100 percent overlap among high 
and low-income consumers in the retail market, 
yet this seems largely arbitrary. 
In the revised study the authors acknowledge 
this dynamic, noting that “if high-income house-
holds only used credit cards and low-income 
households only used cash, and there was com-
plete separation of shopping by households 
across merchants, there would be no transfers 
from credit card payments” (Schuh, Shy, and 
Stavins 2011, 17). In light of residential segrega-
tion and other factors, it is easy to imagine a rela-
tively small degree of overlap among consumers.
In addition, as previously noted, many smaller 
stores with a smaller than average transaction 
size	 actually	 experienced	 an	 increase	 in	 inter-
change fees as a result of the elimination of 
special interchange fees for those merchants. 
In other words, while a large fancy steakhouse 
chain likely received a cut in their interchange 
fees, a local sandwich shop may have seen their 
interchange fees increase. Given that high-in-
come consumers are more likely than low-in-
come consumers to dine at a fancy steakhouse, 
this byproduct of the Durbin Amendment pre-
sumably	exacerbated	any	possible	wealth	trans-
fer from poor to rich households.
Any redistributive effect might be reduced even 
within the same store if high and low income 
consumers tend to purchase different products 
(Turner	et	al.	2013,	34).	For	example,	at	a	store	
such as Best Buy, higher income and lower in-
come customers may purchase different prod-
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ucts. In particular, high-income consumers may 
purchase high-end electronics that have a larger 
markup that they purchase on credit, whereas 
lower-income	consumers	may	purchase	less-ex-
pensive products that have smaller markups. In 
that case, the cross-subsidization would be re-
duced if Best Buy implicitly takes these factors 
into account in its pricing policies.
Third, the Boston Fed’s study is highly depen-
dent on its estimates of the costs of cash to mer-
chants	and	consumers.	For	example,	the	Boston	
Fed estimates the cost to merchants of accept-
ing cash as 0.5 percent of the purchase price for 
consumers and the cost of electronic payments 
as being much higher (Schuh, Shy, and Stavins 
2010, 40). Yet the authors of the study admit that 
this figure – 0.5 percent – is the lowest estimate 
of cost that could be adopted, and that econo-
mists have estimated the cost of credit card pay-
ments in a range running from 0.5 percent to 
1.6 percent (Semeraro 2012). Assessing all of 
the various studies, PERC concludes that a more 
realistic estimate of the cost of cash is 1.3 per-
cent of the purchase, an adjustment that reduces 
the already small size of the purported negative 
wealth transfer from low-income consumers by 
more than half and the benefit to high-income 
households by more than half as well (Turner et 
al. 2013, Table 5).
But even these costs of cash fail to capture all of 
the social costs to consumers from using cash. 
For	 example,	 liquidity-constrained	 consumers	
who	use	cash	may	incur	expensive	overdraft	fees,	
whereas if they used credit cards they would not. 
They also bear the cost of acquiring cash, such as 
time spent travelling and waiting at an ABM and 
the risk of theft or loss of cash. Thus, while cash 
may	seem	less	expensive	to	merchants	than	pay-
ment cards, this is in part simply because mer-
chants	can	externalize	some	of	the	costs	of	cash	
onto consumers.
Fourth, the Boston Fed study also fails to ac-
count for the benefits merchants and consum-
ers receive from accepting debit cards and credit 
cards. As discussed above, once a proper ac-
counting of the benefits of debit cards to mer-
chants is considered, the truth actually may be 
the opposite of the conclusions of the Boston 
Fed study – it may be more accurate that high-in-
come consumers who use payment cards actu-
ally subsidize cash-using low-income consumers. 
Indeed,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 eliminating	 reward	
cards caused consumers to switch from use of 
general-purpose credit cards to store credit, this 
could	 exacerbate	 any	 redistributive	 effect	 from	
low-income to high-income consumers. Dur-
ing the decades when retailers ran their own in
-house credit operations, they usually did so at 
a loss, on the assumption that providing credit 
to their customers would increase store loyalty 
and encourage them to make purchases that 
they otherwise would not be able to afford at the 
time (Zywicki 2000, 92–93). In turn, these losses 
on the store’s credit operations were embedded 
in higher prices for goods and services, forcing 
cash consumers to subsidize credit consumers.
Retailers today that operate their own credit op-
erations similarly force cash consumers to sub-
sidize their own credit consumers. Target de-
partment	store,	for	example,	offers	a	5	percent	
rebate for all purchases made using Target’s 
proprietary credit card, despite the fact that Tar-
get’s	 credit	 card	 customers	 must	 be	 more	 ex-
pensive than its cash customers in light of the 
administrative cost, credit risk, and delay in re-
ceipt of payment.27	Shell	offers	a	$0.20	per	gal-
lon rebate for use of its card at Shell gasoline 
stations (Credit Card Watcher). Similarly, appli-
ance and furniture stores often offer 12 or 18 
month “same as cash” financing through their in
-house credit operations that provide those who 
finance through the retailer’s credit system the 
same price as cash consumers. Even merchants 
that offer co-branded credit cards under a Visa 
or MasterCard logo usually provide enhanced 
rewards for use in their own store.28 Given the 
ubiquity of retailers’ use of credit programs to 
redistribute between cash and credit consumers 
when operating their own credit programs, it is 
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difficult	 to	 accept	 as	 sincere	 their	 expressions	
of concern when bank-type credit cards – with 
cost effects much smaller than the 5 percent dis-
counts	offered	by	Target,	for	example	–	are	used	
to pay.
Therefore, if bank-type credit card issuers are 
effectively prohibited from providing rewards 
yet retailers are permitted to continue to offer 
rewards (such as Target’s cash-back program or 
interest-free financing), this will divert consum-
ers from bank-type cards to retailer’s proprietary 
credit programs. This will not, of course, reduce 
any purported cross-subsidy from low-income 
consumers (who do not use the store cards) to 
higher-income consumers (who do). Thus, it is 
difficult to accept that merchants are motivated 
by a desire to reduce such cross-subsidies in light 
of the most likely scenario of shifting consumers 
to	 store	credit,	which	has	 long	had	exactly	 the	
redistributive effect that the Boston Fed study 
purports to show for credit cards.
Finally, the ubiquity of incentive financing of-
fers by retailers through their own credit oper-
ations illustrates a more fundamental principle: 
the idea of offering rewards and other similar 
incentives in order to encourage customer loy-
alty is neither unusual nor unique to credit card 
issuers. The use of reward programs to promote 
customer loyalty – from frequent flyer miles to 
free sub sandwiches – are a common and pro-
consumer part of the competitive process. More-
over, many of these programs are indistinguish-
able from credit cards in their purported wealth 
transfers.
For	example,	consider	frequent	flyer	miles	pro-
grams. Assume that higher-income people fly 
more frequently than lower-income people and 
thus accrue more frequent flyer miles. Then 
higher-income people will also be eligible for 
more perquisites, such as free travel, free up-
grades,	 and	 access	 to	 other	 benefits.	 Lower-in-
come people, by contrast, who fly less often, will 
have less opportunity to enjoy these benefits, 
but nevertheless will pay indirectly for the free 
travel by higher-income co-passengers. Does 
that mean that regulators should ban frequent 
flyer programs?
As	 an	 even	more	 general	matter,	 this	 example	
illustrates the point that cross-subsidies among 
consumers are ubiquitous in a well-functioning 
retail	 economy.	 For	 example,	 many	 shopping	
stores offer free parking for customers, a cost 
that is embedded in the overhead costs of oper-
ations. Those who take public transportation or 
walk, therefore, must subsidize those who drive 
cars to the store. Because car ownership is pos-
itively correlated with income,29 the widespread 
practice of free parking unambiguously results 
in a wealth transfer from relatively poor to rela-
tively rich households. 
As	these	many	examples	illustrate,	the	claim	by	
special interest lobbyists that credit cards result 
in an unfair wealth transfer from high to low-in-
come consumers is largely opportunistic. Mer-
chants routinely engage in reward schemes and 
other differential pricing (such as free parking) 
that create a variety of cross-subsidies. Their 
concern with payment cards, therefore, appears 
to be less about the presence of cross-subsidies 
among consumers, but rather that they are un-
able to capture the benefits from the cross-sub-
sidies themselves. In short, merchants want to 
capture the benefits of accepting credit cards 
while avoiding the costs.
The Policy Inferences from 
the Boston Fed’s Study Do  
Not Follow
The Boston Fed study, originally published as a 
Working Paper by the Boston Fed, has been sub-
stantially revised and reappeared in an altered 
form in 2011 with numerous methodological 
modifications, yet the revised version does not 
appear to have been officially published as a 
Working Paper (the “Revised Boston Fed Study”) 
(Schuh, Shy, and Stevins 2011). The authors’ 
perception of a need for dramatic revisions re-
flects the widespread criticism that economists 
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have leveled at the original version of the pa-
per; yet the revised version has received even 
more severe criticism than the original version. 
In	short,	 the	Boston	Fed	study	provides	an	ex-
ceedingly weak basis for heavy-handed political 
intervention such as government price controls 
on interchange fees.
Even if the authors are correct about the math-
ematical finding of a small redistributive effect 
from low-income to high-income cardholders 
– a questionable proposition – there remain ad-
ditional questions about the policy inferences 
that they draw from this finding. In particular, 
the authors’ claim that the finding of a cross-sub-
sidy	exists	because	of	reward	cards	supports	the	
imposition of price controls on credit card in-
terchange fees. But even assuming the validity 
of their statistical analysis, this conclusion does 
not follow.
First, the authors’ claim implicitly assumes that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence relation-
ship between interchange fees and credit card 
rewards, such that any mandated reduction in 
interchange fees would automatically result in a 
corresponding decrease in credit card rewards. 
But the authors offer no basis for this assump-
tion. Credit cards offer multiple price and qual-
ity terms and imposing limits on one particular 
price term – interchange fees – does not nec-
essarily imply a one-to-one reduction in card 
quality through a reduction in rewards or that 
any subsequent modification in price or quality 
terms would have a less regressive impact on 
consumers. 
Many card issuers offer rewards on revolving 
balances as well as for transactions. Indeed, as 
noted, even debit cards, which are far simpler 
than credit cards and offer fewer price points on 
which issuers can re-price their losses on con-
trolled terms, did not illustrate a one-to-one 
correspondence between mandated reductions 
on interchange fees and reduced rewards. Al-
though many issuers have responded to the 
Durbin Amendment by slashing or eliminating 
rewards on debit cards, they have taken other 
steps as well to offset the revenue loss, such as 
imposing	 new	 fees	 or	 raising	 existing	 fees	 or	
reduced access and quality (such as by closing 
bank branches). As noted, these offsetting ad-
justments	–	such	as	higher	bank	fees	that	exceed	
the size of the alleged cross-subsidy from low-in-
come to high-income retail consumers and the 
subsequent loss of access to bank accounts for 
many low-income consumers – have impacted 
low-income consumers particularly negatively. 
Thus, the net negative unintended consequences 
for low-income consumers have almost certainly 
been negative. 
The unintended consequences for low-income 
consumers of price controls on interchange fees 
for credit cards are likely to be even more unpre-
dictable and even more harmful to low-income 
consumers than similar price controls on debit 
cards.	 For	 example,	 when	 Australia’s	 central	
bank imposed a hard cap on interchange fees, 
credit card issuers reduced the value of their re-
wards programs to consumers. But Australian 
card issuers also offset the interchange fee cap 
through a variety of other means, such as raising 
annual fees, reducing investments in innovation, 
and raising interest rates. The imposition of an-
nual fees is especially harmful and regressive in 
its impact on low-income consumers because 
annual fees tend to be uncorrelated to the vol-
ume of transactions a consumer makes. Thus, a 
consumer	who	makes	 $4000	 in	 charges	 a	 year	
typically pays the same amount as a consumer 
who	makes	$40,000	in	charges	per	year.	
This consequence of a regressive annual fee is vir-
tually guaranteed by interchange price controls 
modeled after the logic of the Durbin Amend-
ment – by permitting issuers to recover only the 
incremental cost of debit card transactions, the 
Durbin	Amendment	 expressly	prohibits	 issuers	
from recovering the fixed costs associated with 
operating a debit card program, such as cus-
tomer service, dispute resolution services, and 
other related services. Moreover, recall that even 
using the aggressive assumptions of the study’s 
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authors, the transfer from lowest-income house-
holds	was	only	$21	per	household	–	an	amount	
smaller than virtually any amount charged by a 
credit card that charges an annual fee.30 Thus, if 
issuers responded to price controls by imposing 
annual fees on cards, lowest-income households 
would almost certainly end up paying more for 
the opportunity to have a credit card than they 
currently pay in supposed transfers. As a result, 
while debit card issuers have reduced or elimi-
nated rewards programs, their primary response 
has been to impose new monthly maintenance 
fees on bank accounts (typically ranging from 
$60	 to	 $180	 per	 year),	 which	 would	 logically	
follow from the particular structure of the price 
controls	 that	 exclude	 recovery	 of	 fixed	 costs.	
High-income bank consumers, on the other 
hand,	have	experienced	little	direct	negative	im-
pact from the Durbin Amendment, as they can 
usually avoid higher bank fees by meeting the 
heightened minimum deposit requirements in 
order to remain eligible for free chequing. 
In addition, as the Durbin Amendment has ren-
dered many low-income consumers unprofit-
able for banks, this has intensified competition 
for higher-income consumers, who have re-
mained profitable. Furthermore, many high-in-
come consumers have been able to offset the de-
terioration in debit card quality that has resulted 
from the Durbin Amendment’s price controls 
through increased usage of credit cards (whose 
interchange fees remain unregulated); by con-
trast, low-income consumers have less opportu-
nity to switch to credit cards, especially after the 
passage of the Credit CARD Act of 2009, which 
reduced access to credit cards for many low-in-
come consumers. As a result, low-income con-
sumers who have been forced out of the banking 
system by the Durbin Amendment have instead 
shifted to increased use of prepaid cards, prod-
ucts	that	can	be	more	expensive	than	debit	cards	
or credit cards (Zywicki 2013).
Notwithstanding the above critique, let’s assume 
for the sake of argument that the Boston Fed 
study’s finding of a regressive subsidy is sound. 
Even so, the authors’ implicit assumption that 
the most logical inference would be to try to 
force a reduction of rewards for high-income 
consumers does not necessarily follow. An ob-
vious alternative would be to encourage an in-
crease in usage of reward cards by low-income 
consumers. The Boston Fed study concedes that 
those who use reward cards derive net benefits 
from doing so, regardless of their income level; 
that obviously includes low-income consumers 
(Semeraro 2012, citing Schuh, Shy, and Stavins 
2010).31 Meanwhile, the authors provide no 
evidence or theory as to why they believe that 
rewards are available only to high-income con-
sumers. Nor do they make any effort to deter-
mine whether the lower usage of reward cards 
by low-income consumers is involuntary or by 
choice. 
In fact, however, “if high-income households 
receive disproportionate benefits, they do so in 
part because individual members of those house-
holds choose to use credit cards to make a higher 
percentage of their purchases than members of 
low-income households. Any wealth transfer 
that may occur is thus attributable to individual 
consumer choices about payment mechanisms” 
(Semeraro 2012, 12). Moreover, it is not clear 
whether the lower percentage of households 
owning non-rewards cards is because they are 
unable to obtain non-rewards cards on the one 
hand or because they choose not to use them 
(or to apply for them) on the other. The fact that 
reward cards generally also have annual fees 
suggests	the	latter	may	be	the	more	realistic	ex-
planation – and that capping interchange fees 
thus may actually exacerbate the transfer effect 
by further pricing low-income households out of 
the rewards card market.
Finally, the authors of the Boston Fed study 
fail to control for whether their various income 
groups	are	static	over	time.	For	example,	those	
in the low-income group may include college 
students, newly employed workers, and other 
households that may be temporarily lower-in-
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come and less financially sophisticated. As these 
individuals age, they likely will rise into higher 
income brackets and increase their level of finan-
cial sophistication. In light of the huge disparity 
between the relatively small size of the transfer 
from	 low-income	 households	 (approximately	
$8–$21	 annually)	 compared	 to	 the	 very	 large	
benefits accrued by high-income households 
(amounting to hundreds or thousands of dollars 
per year), those who may be low-income sources 
of transfers early in their lives may become much 
larger recipients of transfer later in their lives, 
thereby quickly recovering any amounts trans-
ferred at a younger age.
The Knowledge 
Problem and 
the Pitfalls of 
Regulatory 
Intervention
T he case for imposing interchange fee  price controls and other restrictions on  agreements between the operators of 
payment networks, card issuers, acquirers, and 
merchants has been made almost entirely on the 
basis of economic theory. We have argued that 
this theory fails adequately to take into account 
the role of payment networks as a means of bal-
ancing a two-sided market. We have also shown 
that the contentions of those who argue for reg-
ulations are not well supported empirically. 
But even if government regulation of payment 
networks were justified theoretically, there 
would remain the problem of developing and 
applying regulations that resulted in benefits 
greater than their costs. In particular, effective 
regulatory intervention would have to overcome 
two distinct problems: the knowledge problem 
and the rent-seeking problem.
In a dynamic market economy, each individual 
makes decisions to buy or sell goods and ser-
vices based on his or her unique knowledge set 
and decision-making processes. But that knowl-
edge is constantly changing and so too, if per-
haps more subtly, are those decision-making 
processes. Thus, a new estimate of the size of the 
world’s gas deposits or the announcement of a 
higher speed computer chip, parsed through 
the minds of millions of individuals, result in a 
flux	of	decisions	and	a	constantly	changing	array	
of prices. In other words, prices reflect the dis-
persed knowledge and decisions made by mil-
lions of individuals and businesses. And they are 
constantly changing. Because knowledge and 
decisions are dispersed, they cannot be known 
by any single entity – such as a government regu-
lator. This is the knowledge problem.
The knowledge problem means that even well 
intentioned interventions will have unintended 
consequences.	 In	 the	 US,	 for	 example,	 many	
small merchants have actually seen their inter-
change fees rise as a result of the Durbin Amend-
ment while large retailers have reaped huge 
windfalls. Where regulators have imposed a right 
to surcharge on private contracts, merchants 
have abused consumers surcharged opportu-
nistically at above-cost rates, giving rise to calls 
for further intervention. Similarly, in the Neth-
erlands merchants have continued to surcharge 
for some transactions for which today it is more 
efficient to use cards than cash, thereby impos-
ing costs on those consumers who would prefer 
to	use	 the	 less-expensive	payment	mechanism.	
In Australia, the application of price controls to 
the four-party payment schemes has promoted 
market share growth for three-party payment 
schemes. Moreover, the evidence suggests that 
lower-income consumers to bear the brunt of in-
terchange price controls.
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These	 examples	 illustrate	 the	basic	dynamic	of	
the knowledge problem confronting regulators: 
even if there is believed to be a market failure, 
there remains the daunting task of creating 
and implementing a regulatory framework that 
will actually bring about the desired ends with-
out unintended consequences that will swamp 
those desired results. Consider the challenge of 
setting an efficient interchange fee cap. As Anne 
Layne-Farrar	 shows,	 there	 is	 no	 one	 single	 in-
terchange fee price cap that will be appropriate 
for all industries (2013). A policy based on the 
“average” payment amount fails to take into ac-
count the fact that the average transaction size 
will vary widely from industry to industry – thus, 
the breakeven point for the efficiency of pay-
ment cards may be higher for hardware stores or 
sporting goods stores relative to grocery stores 
or convenience stores. Yet a “hard cap” on inter-
change fees invariably presupposes one single 
price for all industries. Such a “one-size-fits-all” 
cap is also unquestionably a “one-size-fits-none” 
cap. To state the obvious, there is a sound eco-
nomic reason why interchange fees vary widely 
among industries when they are set by market 
processes: different industries have different ef-
ficient interchange fee rates. A one-size-fits-all in-
terchange fee ignores these important economic 
differences, leading to winners and losers among 
different industries depending on whether the 
regulated rate (based on the average rate) is too 
high or too low.
As	the	above	examples	illustrate,	the	knowledge	
problem means that there is no unique, objec-
tively correct regulatory solution. Politicians and 
regulators will therefore seek information en-
abling them to make decisions regarding how 
to regulate payments. While the intervention 
may well have net social costs, the majority of 
those who gain and lose (consumers and smaller 
merchants) are dispersed, and are unlikely to be 
able	to	voice	their	concerns	effectively	except	via	
groups representing consumers and small busi-
nesses, who tend to have many different issues. 
By contrast, larger companies that stand to gain 
or lose from intervention have strong incentives 
to lobby. Companies that stand to gain are called 
rent seekers because their aim is to obtain the 
economic rent (or additional profit) created by 
the intervention. The resources spent on lobby-
ing are considered waste because those same 
resources are not available for productive eco-
nomic activity (Tullock 1967; Kreuger 1974).
In the US, both merchants and banks spent mil-
lions of dollars in lobbying for and against price 
controls on interchange fees (Zywicki 2010, 53). 
Today those same parties continue to spend vast 
sums of money in the political process, money 
that otherwise could be spent on productive ac-
tivity (Stearns and Zywicki 2009).32 Meanwhile, 
around the world special interests continue to 
lobby legislatures and regulators on interchange 
price controls and other market interventions, 
wasting millions of dollars and distorting the 
process by which blackboard economic theory is 
converted into real-world regulation.
The Implications 
for Payment Card 
Regulation in 
Canada
T he above analysis of the impacts of regu-  latory intervention leads to several con- 	 clusions	regarding	existing	and	proposed	
regulation of payment cards in Canada.
First, contrary to the claims of proponents, it is 
clear that the imposition of price controls on 
payment cards has adverse effects on most con-
sumers and many retailers. Moreover, these price 
controls are regressive: they result in greater 
harm to poorer consumers and smaller retailers. 
They have literally made the poor poorer.
Second, the claim that restrictions on surcharg-
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ing and the honour-all-cards rule harm mer-
chants does not appear to be borne out by the 
facts. Honour all cards is an essential element 
of a balanced payments system, and it confers 
as much benefit on merchants as it does con-
sumers and other participants. Meanwhile, mer-
chants have always been able to discount for 
cash should they so choose. Moreover, where 
restrictions on surcharging have been removed 
by government intervention, such as in Australia 
and the UK, merchants seem to be surcharging 
opportunistically (imposing higher surcharges 
in markets where cards are the primary payment 
form, such as airline tickets), not on the basis of 
the interchange fees being charged.
In theory it might be possible to limit this op-
portunistic behavior by imposing caps on sur-
charges. As the evidence from the Netherlands 
indicates, however, innovations mean that it 
would be necessary to frequently change the 
permissible surcharge. Moreover, surcharge 
levels would vary considerably by industry. To 
make matters worse, knowledge of these costs is 
dispersed widely and could only be crudely and 
intermittently estimated using whatever data 
firms might be compelled to disclose to the price 
regulator. As a result, such caps would likely 
have distributional effects, benefiting some mer-
chants while harming others.
Third, the claim that higher-income consumers 
benefit	at	the	expense	of	lower-income	consum-
ers as a result of the greater use of reward cards 
by higher-income consumers is contested. As 
discussed above, this claim is based on one ques-
tionable study produced under the aegis of the 
US Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in 2009 and 
is described in a misleading manner by the NDP 
Orange Paper. Moreover, it is unclear to what 
extent	the	authors	of	the	Boston	Fed	study	actu-
ally stand by their own conclusions in that 2009 
analysis, as that publication apparently has been 
obviated by a subsequent and radically different 
version of the paper (Schuh, Shy, and Stavins 
2011). The apparent reluctance of the authors 
to stand by their own study should warrant cau-
tion about basing sweeping policy interventions 
on it.
Thus, the claim that interchange fee regulations, 
prohibitions on surcharging, or restrictions on 
the honour-all-cards rule are beneficial to “all 
stakeholders, particularly small and medium 
sized businesses, entrepreneurs, and consum-
ers” is simply false. The opposite is more nearly 
the case. As the foregoing analysis of similar in-
terventions elsewhere shows, there is little rea-
son to believe that most stakeholders would 
benefit. Instead, similar interventions have 
generally resulted in higher costs and reduced 
quality for consumers for credit cards and other 
financial services with no evidence of offsetting 
retail price reductions. Moreover, while the en-
actment of the Durbin Amendment in the US has 
proven	a	boon	to	big	box	retailers,	 it	has	actu-
ally resulted in a price increase for many small 
merchants and higher bank fees and reduced 
services for consumers.
What of more specific objections, such as the 
claim that fees charged to merchants are “un-
fair” to merchants and consumers? The reality is 
that the fees charged by operators of payment 
systems enable those operators to invest in in-
novations	and	system	expansion	that,	over	time,	
brings additional benefits to consumers and 
merchants. To return to our analogy from ear-
lier, newspapers, likewise, are able to increase 
their circulation and innovate other platforms, 
such as website and mobile device versions, us-
ing fees paid by advertisers – thereby increas-
ing the number of eyeballs seeing those ads. 
Imagine what would happen if the government 
capped the fees newspapers could charge for 
advertising: immediately, newspapers would 
increase the amount they charge per copy and/
or cut their investments in content production. 
This would harm their readers and likely result 
in a reduction in the number of readers, to the 
detriment of most advertisers.
Conclusion: 
Toward a More 
Dynamic Market
F or a payment system to grow, it must serve  the needs of both buyers and sellers. As  in other markets, competition – or at least 
the threat of competition – incentivizes network 
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operators to identify better ways to serve both 
sides of the market, driving innovations that im-
prove the quality of service and reduce costs. 
This is precisely what we see in credit card mar-
kets in both the US and Canada. Among other in-
novations, in the past two decades, we have seen 
the development of more secure, effective, and 
rapid payment network architecture; more rapid 
transaction devices, such as RFID-embedded 
cards; payment systems embedded in mobile de-
vices; and innovative, competitive payment sys-
tems (PayPal, Square).
But Canada is unusual in that its credit card 
and debit card networks have evolved on diver-
gent tracks. Whereas Canada’s credit card mar-
ket has followed the rest of world to a globally 
integrated, fully functional payment and credit 
system, its debit card system has arguably stag-
nated under the dominance of the Interac sys-
tem, a unique Canadian development. Although 
Interac proved quite functional and efficient at 
delivering payment card services to Canadians, 
the	 economy’s	 near-exclusive	 reliance	 on	 In-
terac, along with regulatory mandates that have 
hindered new entry and minimized incentives 
for Interac’s continued evolution, have deprived 
consumers and businesses of the electronic pay-
ments functionality taken for granted elsewhere. 
For	example,	online	shopping	using	a	debit	card	
is	exceedingly	cumbersome	 in	Canada	and	not	
ubiquitously available. And use of Interac cards 
abroad	 is	 exceedingly	 difficult;	 in	 fact,	 Interac	
cards work at only some outlets in the US and 
almost nowhere else. This inefficiency has nega-
tive implications for small business development 
and economic efficiency in the country more 
generally.
The regulator who attempts to set prices does 
not have access to the knowledge or decision-
making process of the millions of individuals 
whose actions previously determined the prices, 
so he will almost inevitably choose a price that 
differs from the one that would have emerged 
from the bottom up. Among the many challenges 
facing	the	price-fixing	regulator	 is	 the	difficulty	
of	defining	the	market	for	which	they	are	fixing	
the	price.	In	the	context	of	payment	systems,	for	
example,	 the	 regulator	might	choose	 to	fix	 the	
price of all payment systems, including ones that 
might	be	developed	in	the	future;	or	it	might	fix	
the price only of current payment systems; or it 
might	fix	the	price	of	only	one	or	a	few	payment	
systems. The way the market is defined can have 
wide ranging consequences for the impact of 
any regulations.
The solution to this conundrum is not to attempt 
to regulate prices. (Montesquieu realized this 
260 years ago, when he observed in L’esprit des 
Lois that the “just price” is the market price). In 
the case of Canada’s payments system, the solu-
tion is to remove the Consent Order – or at least 
key portions of it – so that Interac is no longer 
constrained by rules restricting its ability to de-
velop and compete. Perhaps of greatest impor-
tance is the removal of restrictions on the setting 
of interchange fees. The removal of these restric-
tions would enable Interac members to invest in 
new technologies and build out their networks 
knowing that if they offer a superior service, they 
will be able to charge more for it.
Sadly, rather than recognizing that the way for-
ward for Canada is to reform its debit card sys-
tem in the competitive model of its credit cards, 
some critics want to dictate significant business 
practices and impose price controls on the credit 
card market (Thibeault 2013, 4; 6–7). Touted as 
an initiative “to protect consumers or small busi-
nesses	 from	excessive	credit	 card	costs”	 (1),	 in	
reality, as we have demonstrated, the proposed 
interventions would almost certainly increase 
costs for consumers, reduce innovation, and 
hamper the efficiency of the Canadian payment 
system.
The	modern	credit	card	network	 is	an	extraor-
dinary	 interconnected	 and	 complex	 economic	
system that serves the needs of consumers, busi-
nesses, governments, and society. The notion 
that regulators can surgically intervene and tin-
ker with some of the dials, such as by setting cer-
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tain prices or imposing specific contract terms, 
without having major unintended consequences 
that will ripple across the entire payment card 
system and economy is naïve. Unintended con-
sequences of intervention are inevitable and 
costly, and they are especially relevant for a mar-
ket	as	complex	and	integral	to	the	functioning	of	
the economic system as the credit card network.
Policy-makers should resist special interest pres-
sures (from, most notably, retailers) for sweep-
ing new interventions whose unintended con-
sequences will almost certainly overwhelm any 
alleged social benefit. Instead, Canadian officials 
should	retain	the	existing	framework	created	by	
the Code of Conduct (which itself still imposes 
significant restrictions on business practices). 
The Code of Conduct has provided a useful, ef-
fective framework for the evolution of the Cana-
dian credit card system. Although imperfect, the 
Code of Conduct provides consumer protection, 
systemic security as well as a sufficiently adaptive 
environment to facilitate competition and a pay-
ment system responsive to changing consumer 
preferences, technology, and risks.
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Endnotes
1  The NDP Orange Paper suggests that credit card fees are between 2–3 percent of the total 
purchase	prices,	while	debit	card	fees	are	about	$0.12	regardless	of	the	size	of	the	purchase.	
2  Moreover, according to the same Ari Weinberg March 25, 2004 article for Forbes, when 
McDonald’s began accepting cards in 2003, only 14.5 percent of quick-service restaurants 
accepted cards at that time, belying the claim that merchants have no choice but to accept 
cards, even if they have negative value. McDonald’s decision was more reasonably caused by the 
recognition that the increased convenience and speed to consumers would increase profitability. 
3  In the Wall Street Journal on August 9, 2013, John McKinnon and Siobhan Hughes report that 
the	US	Internal	Revenue	Service,	for	example,	has	just	launched	a	new	enforcement	program	
aimed	at	alleged	underreporting	of	cash	sales	by	small	businesses	in	order	to	reduce	their	tax	
bills. Interestingly, the methodology used by the IRS to catch scofflaws is whether a particular 
business reports an unusually high percentage of transactions being made by payment cards, 
suggesting an underreporting of cash transactions..
4	 	For	a	fuller	explanation	of	the	economics	of	two-sided	markets	generally,	and	payment	systems	
in particular, see Todd J. Zywicki, 2010, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and 
the Limits of Regulation.
5  Because cheques are required to clear at par (zero discount) from the perspective of merchants, 
consumers bear the full costs of acquiring cheques and maintaining bank accounts. Merchants, 
on the other hand, bear the risk that a cheque will bounce and be returned for nonpayment. 
Nevertheless, despite these costs, both consumers and merchants used (and still use) cheques 
because they offered a simple solution to a “liquidity problem”: they enable consumers to make 
purchases (especially larger purchases) even when they do not have sufficient cash on hand. 
Cheques also enable consumers to make payments remotely, such as paying bills or making 
purchases by mail.
6  Interestingly, the Competition Tribunal noted that “it is open to third parties participating in 
a consent proceeding before the Tribunal to challenge the Director’s formulation of an abuse 
of	dominance	case	brought	on	consent	on	the	grounds	that,	for	example,	the	Director	has	
artificially or simply mistakenly drawn the boundaries of the relevant markets …” (16).
7  See also Philippe Bergevin and Todd J. Zywicki, 2011, The Way We Should Pay: Comments on 
“The Way We Pay: Transforming the Canadian Payments System.” 
8  In addition, the Durbin Amendment has had predictable negative consequences on competition 
and growth in the retail banking industry. Writing for Forbes on March 29, 2012, Halah Touryalai 
tells	the	story	of	Prosperity	Bancshares,	Inc.,	a	mid-sized	bank	in	Houston,	Texas.	Prosperity	
Bancshares,	Inc.	announced	in	2012	that	it	was	explicitly	keeping	its	assets	below	the	$10	billion	
trigger	level	because	exceeding	that	level	would	force	it	to	comply	with	the	Durbin	Amendment,	
resulting	in	an	estimated	revenue	loss	of	$5	million	per	year.
9  Although Iacobuzio’s estimate of a 50 percent drop in debit card revenues as a result of the 
Durbin Amendment appears to be largely accurate, overdraft revenues have not dropped by 30 
percent.	From	a	high	of	$37	billion	in	2009,	overdraft	revenue	fell	to	under	$32	billion	in	2011	
but rose in 2012 (Wack 2013). For a review of various new regulations on overdraft protection in 
the US, see Todd J. Zywicki, 2012, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft Protection.
10	 	Both	historical	and	economic	analysis	of	hundreds	of	years	of	experience	with	the	imposition	
of price controls in consumer credit markets has demonstrated that the invariable effect of 
such regulations is regressive in their impact, as they tend to reduce the profitability of serving 
lower-income consumers and to shift capital toward more-profitable higher-income consumers 
(Durken et al., forthcoming 2014). 
11  The Federal Reserve’s 2008 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice reported that 6 percent of 
those in the study did not have bank accounts (Schuh and Stavins 2011, 6). 
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12  In a 2010 Q4 Home Depot Inc. Earnings Conference call on February 22, 2011, Home Depot 
CFO Carol Tomé said,“On the Durbin side …, [b]ased on the Fed's draft regulations, we think 
the	benefit	to	The	Home	Depot	could	be	$35	million	a	year.”		
13  Annual fees are an especially pernicious form of term re-pricing of credit card contracts because 
annual	fees	operate	as	a	sort	of	“tax”	on	card	ownership,	thereby	stifling	competition.	See	also	
Zywicki, 2010, Economics of Interchange, at 36.
14  As the authors describe these merchant-branded platinum cards: “These merchant-branded 
cards typically have relatively generous rewards programs with reward structures not seen for 
traditional	merchant-branded	cards;	for	example,	a	number	of	significantly	discounted	flights	per	
year	irrespective	of	reward	points	earned.	Like	many	merchant-branded	cards,	cardholders	also	
earn more reward points for spending at the merchant in question” (2012). The authors appear 
to ignore or overlook the obvious fact that any purported redistribution among consumers 
according to payment methods would apply equally to merchant-branded credit cards as 
independent cards.
15 For instance see MasterCard’s “MasterCard Rules.” 
16  “[T]he honor-all-cards rule appears to have been used by all systems throughout the history of 
the industry. It ensures the cardholder side of the market that their cards will be accepted on the 
merchant side” (Evans and Schmalensee 2005, 292).
17	 	On	the	magnitude	of	the	cost	of	fraud	to	issuing	banks,	see,	for	example,	Zywicki,	2010,	
Economics of Interchange,	at	8–14	(“Visa	and	MasterCard	card	issuers	alone	wrote	off	almost	$50	
billion	in	uncollected	credit	card	debt	in	the	US	in	2008,	and	$65	billion	in	2009	–	more	than	5	
percent of the total volume of credit card purchases by their cardholders [in 2009].”).
18 See, for instance, MasterCard’s “MasterCard Rules.” 
19  See also Reserve Bank of Australia, 2011. “A Variation to the Surcharging Standards: A 
Consultation Document”; UK Office of Fair Trading, 2011,“Payment Surcharges: Response to the 
Which? Super-Complaint.”
20	 	This	figure	appears	to	exclude	other	social	costs	of	cash,	such	as	increased	risk	of	crime	and	tax	
evasion. If those costs of cash are included then presumably the break-even point from a social 
perspective would be at an even lower dollar value.
21  Of course, this assumes that cards are actually more costly than cash. As discussed above, cards 
are	unambiguously	less	expensive	than	cash	for	a	large	number	of	transactions	and	it	is	arguably	
only for an ever-shrinking category of small-dollar transactions that the total cost of cash can be 
said	to	be	lower	than	cards.	As	noted,	for	example,	in	the	Netherlands,	the	only	transactions	for	
which	cash	is	less	expensive	than	cards	is	for	transactions	of	about	€5 or less.
22  As the authors of one paper on the matter note: “measuring price effects over time of 
interchange fee regulation is difficult” (Carbó Valverde, Chakravorti, and Rodríguez-Fernández 
2009, 9).
23  In the US, 29 percent of transactions are made with debit cards (Foster et al. 2011, 14). 
24  The NDP Orange Paper is arguably misleading on how it describes the findings of the Boston 
Fed Study. It states, “[i]n fact, a 2009 paper by the Federal Reserve of Boston estimated that, 
on	average,	each	cash-using	household	effectively	transfers	$149	to	card-using	households	
each year, and because of the demographics of card- and cash-/debit-users, this constitutes a 
regressive transfer from poor consumers to the rich” (Thibeault 2013, 2). The natural reading 
of that passage would lead one to conclude that the transfer from low-income to high-income 
households	is	also	estimated	to	be	$149	per	year,	but	that	is	not	the	case.	That	figure	($149)	
is in fact only the estimated transfer from cash to credit-using households. The transfer from 
all low-income to high-income households reported in the Boston Fed Study, by contrast, is 
much	smaller,	approximately	$8–$21	annually.	It	is	difficult	to	escape	the	conclusion	that	the	
artful phrasing in the NDP Orange Paper is designed to leave the misleading impression that 
interchange fee reductions would have significant, economy-wide implications, when, in reality, 
the study’s claims are far more limited. 
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25  Identifying assumption A-2 as “The merchant passes through the full merchant fee to its 
customers via the retail price.”
26	 	An	increasing	costs	industry	is	one	in	which	expansions	of	output	are	possible	only	by	pulling	in	
inputs	that	are	sufficiently	scarce	such	that	their	prices	rise	as	a	result	of	the	output	expansion	in	
the	industry	in	question.	Large	markets	are	always	faced	with	this	constraint.
27  Writing for Money Crashers, Jason Steele reports that Target has recently added a Target debit 
card that also offers a 5 percent rebate on all purchases. Both cards also provide free shipping for 
any orders made from Target.com. 
28	 	For	example,	the	L.L.Bean	Visa	card	offers	a	higher	rate	of	“bonus	points”	for	purchases	made	
at	L.L.Bean	than	at	other	retailers,	although	it	provides	rewards	even	for	purchases	made	at	
competitor’s stores.
29	 	In	England	in	1995,	for	example,	high-income	households	were	more	than	twice	as	likely	to	have	
regular access to a car than low-income households (Dargay 2001, 807; 809) (only 41 percent 
of lowest-income quintile families had regular access to a car but 91 percent of higher-income 
quintile did).
30  The study is confused on this point. The authors respond to this point by noting that in 2003 
“low-income	households	paid	an	average	annual	fee	of	$5.70,	while	high-income	households	
paid	$7.70.”	The	authors	cite	a	2003	Synergistics	Credit	Card	Market	survey	as	the	basis	for	
this statement. We have been unable to locate the details of that study to determine how those 
figures were calculated, but it is likely irrelevant to the main point. By reporting the average 
annual fee, the study presumably is reporting the mean fee, including the majority of cards that 
have no annual fee. We are aware of no credit card that actually has an annual fee for which the 
annual	fee	is	anywhere	near	$7.70.	A	survey	reported	in	2010	found	that	while	only	28	of	108	
credit cards had annual fees, those that did have annual fees reported a median annual fee of 
about	$50.	The	smallest	fee	reported	was	$18	and	fees	ranged	up	to	several	hundred	dollars	
per	year.	Moreover,	the	card	with	the	lowest	annual	fee	($18)	and	three	of	the	four	cards	with	
the lowest annual fees in the survey were secured credit cards, not ordinary credit cards (Simon 
2010). Based on the figures reported in that survey, the average annual fee for the entire set of 
cards	was	only	$12.96	–	but	that	is	only	because	the	large	number	of	cards	with	no	annual	fee	
distract	from	the	fact	that	for	cards	with	an	annual	fee	the	median	amount	was	$50	(note	that	
using the median annual fee avoids the obverse problem of a few high-fee cards pulling up the 
average).	Even	if	$50	is	too	high,	the	fact	that	the	lowest	fee	card	in	the	survey	was	$18	for	a	
secured	card	suggests	that	for	those	cards	that	have	an	annual	fee	it	is	highly	unrealistic	to	expect	
an	annual	fee	of	less	than	$20–$25	per	year.
  The authors of the study thus fail to address the relevant question, which is that if interchange 
price controls generate term re-pricing in the form of new annual fees on cards that were 
previously	free,	then	the	average	rate	might	rise	substantially.	For	example,	prior	to	the	Durbin	
Amendment, the mean monthly service charge for bank accounts would have been quite low 
because the vast majority of accounts had no fees. Two years later, however, free chequing 
has become a shrinking minority of accounts while a majority of accounts now pay monthly 
maintenance	fees	that	amount	$60–$120	per	year.	Thus,	the	low	average account maintenance 
fee prior to the Durbin Amendment says little about the state of the world after price controls.
31  Table 6 on pages 20–21 of the Boston Fed Study illustrates that low-income buyers receive an 
annual	subsidy	of	$613.
32  See Chapter 2 of Stearns and Zywicki’s Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law 
describing the process of “rent seeking” and noting that the social cost of rent-seeking is the 
diversion of real resources from productive to purely redistributive purposes.
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Stéphane Dion (PC) is the Member of Par-
liament for the riding of Saint-Laurent–
Cartierville in Montreal. He was first 
elected in 1996 and served as the Minister 
of Intergovernmental Affairs in the Chre-
tien government. He later served as leader 
of the Liberal Party of Canada and the 
Leader of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition 
in the Canadian House of Commons from 
2006 to 2008. Prior to entering politics, 
Mr. Dion was a professor at the Université 
de Montréal. This Commentary is based 
on Mr. Dion’s presentation, entitled Seces-
sion and the Virtues of Clarity, which was 
delivered at the 8th Annual Michel Basta-
rache Conference at the Rideau Club on 
February 11, 2011.
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Stéphane Dion (CP) est député fédéral 
pour la circonscription de Saint-Laurent–
Cartierville à Montréal. Il a été élu pour 
la première fois en 1996 et a servi en tant 
que ministre des Affaires intergouverne-
mentales dans le gouvernement Chrétien. 
Il est par la suite devenu chef du Parti 
libéral du Canada et chef de l’Opposition 
à la Chambre des communes de 2006 à 
2008. Avant de faire de la politique, M. 
Dion était professeur à l’Université de 
Montréal. Ce Commentaire reprend les 
principaux éléments de l’allocution de M. 
Dion intitulée « La sécession et les vertus 
de la clarté », prononcée lors de la 8e Con-
férence annuelle Michel Bastarache au 
Rideau Club le 11 février 2011.
It is an honour and a pleasure for me to have been invited to the Michel Bastarache 
Commission… excuse me, Conference.
When they invited me, Dean Bruce Feldthusen and Vice-Dean François Larocque sug-
gested the theme of “clarity in the event of secession”. And indeed, I believe this is 
a theme that needs to be addressed, because the phenomenon of secession poses a 
major challenge for a good many countries and for the international community. One 
question to which we need the answer is this: under what circumstances, and by what 
means, could the delineation of new international borders between populations be a 
just and applicable solution? 
I will argue that one document which will greatly assist the international community 
in answering that question is the opinion rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada 
on August 20, 1998 concerning the Reference on the secession of Quebec. This opin-
ion, a turning point in Canadian history, could have a positive impact at the interna-
tional level. It partakes of the great tradition of our country’s contribution to peace and 
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one of the leading policy think tanks 
in our nation’s capital. The Institute 
has distinguished itself as a thoughtful, 
empirically-based and non-partisan 
contributor to our national public 
discourse.
PRIME MINISTER STEPHEN HARPER
As the author Brian Lee Crowley has 
set out, there is a strong argument 
that the 21st Century could well be the 
Canadian Century.
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER DAVID CAMERON
In the global think tank world, MLI 
has emerged quite suddenly as the 
“disruptive” innovator, achieving a 
well-deserved profile in mere months 
that most of the established players 
in the field can only envy. In a 
medium where timely, relevant, and 
provocative commentary defines value, 
MLI has already set the bar for think 
tanks in Canada.
PETER	NICHOLSON,	FORMER	SENIOR	POLICY	
ADVISOR	TO	PRIME	MINISTER	PAUL	MARTIN
The reports and studies coming out 
of MLI are making a difference and 
the Institute is quickly emerging as a 
premier Canadian think tank.
JOCK	FINLAYSON,	EXECUTIVE	VICE	PRESIDENT	
OF	POLICY,	BUSINESS	COUNCIL	OF	 
BRITISH	COLUMBIA
Very much enjoyed your presentation 
this morning. It was first-rate and an 
excellent way of presenting the options 
which Canada faces during this period 
of “choice”... Best regards and keep up 
the good work.
PRESTON MANNING, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 
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